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Summary 
 
This study forms part of the ADB funded multi-country project on ‘Pro-poor intervention strategies in 
irrigated agriculture in Asia’ implemented by the International Water Management Institute (IWMI in 
collaboration with national partners in six Asian countries: Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan 
and Vietnam. These countries together account for over 51 percent of global net irrigated area and over 73 
percent of net irrigated area in Asia, with most of this area located in China, India and Pakistan. In the 
context of on-going i nstitutional reforms in irrigation sector  in these  countries, there have been much 
discussions on the role of irrigation charging/pricing and cost recovery for improving management of water 
resources. However, these discussions have focused on efficiency and resource allocation aspects with only 
little attention to equity dimension of charging/pricing. This study focuses on equity aspects of canal water 
charging/pricing and addresses two key questions:  how irrigation charging is linked to irrigation 
performance and poverty; and what are the implications of alternate charging methods for cost recovery, 
equity and poverty, particularly under conditions of (in)equity in land and water distribution. The study 
describe in detail key characteristics of charging methods that are in practice on ground based on field level 
information and data from 26 irrigation systems in six countries; undertakes comparative analysis of 
alternate charging methods; identifies their strengths and limitations; and highlights factors influencing the 
choice of charging methods in particular settings. 
 
In the studied systems, irrigation charge varies from US$ 1 to US$ 67 per ha, and the collection rate varies 
from 5 percent to 99 percent. In general, irrigation charge level and the collection rate is lower in the 
studied systems in South Asian countries than those in China, Indonesia and Vietnam. The study findings 
indicate that: (1) in the Chinese and Vietnamese systems studied, land and water distribution is relatively 
equitable. Irrigation charges are directly or indirectly linked to irrigation service delivery/ water supplies. In 
these systems, irrigation charges, regardless of whether based on size of landholdings or cropping 
intensities, tends to be relatively equitable. What is important for revenue generation/cost recovery for 
these systems is to increase the charge to the level where it reflects cost of supplying water and /or benefits 
derived from water use and to further improve on collection efficiency; (2) in Indonesia, landholdings are 
generally of smaller sizes, and there is element of inequity in distribution of both land and water. Under 
multiple criteria based charging method (as in the transferred systems) structure of charging is such that 
charges are linked to water supplied/used, and it accounts for poverty concerns. Here too, what is needed is 
to increase the level of irrigation charges and overall collection efficiency for improved cost recovery; (3) 
in the South Asian systems, land and water distribution across farms tends to be fairly inequitable, and 
charge is not linked to irrigation service or amount of water supplied, and overall charge level is very low. 
In such systems, not only the level of charge needs to be increased, the structure of charging also needs to 
be improved for improving cost recovery in more equitable and pro-poor ways; (4) irrigation charging 
methods in Vietnam and China are relatively better as they account for locational differences in service 
delivery /water supplies, and to some extent reflect cost of supplying water. On the other hand, while 
present charging methods in South Asian systems, are easy to administer, they lack transparency and are 
often inequitable and biased against the poor small farmers; and (5) quantitative analysis suggests that 
irrigation charge level affects system performance, which in turn, influences poverty in the systems, that is 
low charge level indirectly dis-benefit the poor.  
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In systems where irrigation charges are low, funding for the sector is often low and maintenance of the 
systems is neglected; there is a lack of incentives for service providers to improve on service delivery, and 
lack of incentives for users to demand for improved services; and accountability linkages between 
managers and water users are weak;  there are no incentives for users to improve on water use efficiency, 
and low charge policy worsens income distribution especially in those settings where there is greater degree 
of inequity in land and water distribution (as in most South Asian systems), as large part of benefits of 
subsidies to irrigation sector goes to larger landholders. Overall system performance, and revenue 
collection and cost recovery is better in those systems where there are decentralized institutional 
arrangements for irrigation management.  The study suggests that in China and Vietnam, the level of 
irrigation charge needs to be increased to reflect the cost of supplying water. In the South Asian systems, 
not only the level of charge needs to be increased, the charging structure needs to be corrected such that 
they are linked to irrigation service. 
 
The study offers several important lessons for designing an effective charging policy. These include: (i) 
there are a number of charging methods in practice in the studied systems, and the choice of a charging 
method in a particular setting depends on a range of factors including water allocation mechanisms and 
water rights, characteristics of delivery systems (supply-based ore demand –based), value of irrigation 
water, variability in water flows and distribution losses, number of farms to be served, social objectives 
such as food security and poverty alleviation and other factors such as transaction cost of charge 
collection.; (ii) irrigation charging influences irrigation performance, which in turn, influences poverty.; 
and (iii) the impacts of a particular charging method on system performance depends on distribution 
structure of land and water. Where land and water tends to be equitably distributed (as in China and 
Vietnam) it is mainly the level of charge that matters for revenues and cost recovery. On the other hand, in 
settings where land and water distribution tends to be inequitable, both the level and the structure of 
charging are important not only in relation to revenues and cost recovery, but they have implications for 
equity in income distribution. Under such settings, indiscriminate application of low charge policy dis-
benefits the poor. Also, in such settings charging structure, which is not linked to irrigation service and 
which does not account for landholding size, often favors the non-poor.  For systems characterized by 
greater inequity in land and water distribution across systems and farms, as those in Pakistan, the study 
analyzes various policy options and suggests that flat rate or differential rate charging linked to landholding 
size would be pro-equity/pro-poor and would lead to increased revenues/cost recovery. The suggested 
options  can be implemented with existing institutional arrangements.  The on-going irrigation sector 
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Implications of Alternate Irrigation Water Charging Policies for the 
Poor Farmers in Developing Asia: A Comparative Analysis 
 




It is well known that the performance of many large and medium scale canal irrigation systems in 
most developing countries has been generally unsatisfactory. Historically, these systems have 
been owned, managed and operated by government agencies. Most of these publicly managed 
systems are  often  characterized by poor management, unreliable water supplies, poor 
maintenance and management of  infrastructure, inefficiency and inequity in water use and 
distribution and financial dependence on government budgets. Poor service delivery, a net 
outcome of these factors, results in low crop productivity and overall low returns from farming. 
Inappropriate institutions and m anagement practices, and inadequate funding and inefficient 
spending  are generally regarded as fundamental causes of the poor performance in irrigation 
sector. These factors reduce the benefits of investments in irrigation development and 
management to the societies (World Bank, 1999, Hussain and Biltonen 2002). 
 
With growing realization of these problems, coupled with  continuing reduction in  public 
expenditures for irrigation, pressure for reforms in irrigation sector has been increasing over the 
past decade. The stated overall goal of the reform initiatives is to better utilize the available water 
resources in more sustainable, equitable and productive manner. Interventions proposed in reform 
initiatives have focused on four key areas: (1) formulation of policies, laws and regulations on 
water allocation and use; (2) development and re-organization of water management institutions 
(such as establishment of river basin organizations or autonomous bodies for water management); 
(3) participatory water management, and management transfer to user organizations; and (4) 
financing for water – improved cost recovery and water charging/pricing methods, with emphasis 
on the use of economic instruments in water management. This paper focuses on the last aspect, 
specifically on methods of charging/pricing for irrigation water, of reforms. 
 
In the irrigation sector reforms, the emphasis on water charging/pricing has motivated from the 
perspectives of improving efficiency in resource allocation in the context of growing scarcity and 
competition for water, and for improving cost recovery and for reducing subsidies to the sector, 
with the overall goal of making irrigation sector financially self-sufficient and sustainable with 
minimum or no dependence on public funds. While efficiency incentive and financial functions of 
water pricing/charging (i.e. to encourage efficient use of scarce water resources, and  to raise 
revenues to pay for cost of producing or supplying  water),  have been widely discussed and 
debated, and a significant amount of work, both theoretical and empirical, have appeared in the 
literature, however,  their  distributional function (i.e. to redistribute scarce resources across 
regions or socio-economic groups)  have received only little attention. It is likely that a 
pricing/charging regime that may be efficient in terms of ensuring full cost recovery, may 
adversely affect the poor, and particularly so in settings characterized by inequity in land and   6 
water distribution. Where poverty is a major concern, and poverty dimension has been recognized 
in reform initiatives, it is important that charging and cost recovery policies be designed such that 
they explicitly account for such concerns. While efficiency, cost recovery and equity aspects of 
water pricing/charging
1 are inter-related, the study largely focuses on the distributional aspects, 
and to some extent relates this  to the financial aspects. While efficiency aspect
2  of 
charging/pricing  is discussed and related to other two aspects where necessary, but it is not the 
central focus of this study. 
 
The key questions addressed in the  paper are:  how irrigation charging  is linked to irrigation 
performance and poverty; and what are the implications of alternate charging methods for cost 
recovery, equity and poverty, particularly under conditions of (in)equity in land and water 
distribution. The study describes in detail  key characteristics of charging methods that are in 
practice on ground in diverse settings, and their strengths and limitations, and highlights factors 
influencing the choice of a charging method in a particular setting. The analysis of charging 
methods in this study covers three main aspects: level of charge, the structure of charge (defined 
by how the charge is related to service delivery, water supplies, crop types, crop output, crop 




The purpose of this study is to provide a comparative analysis of irrigation water charging/pricing 
methods based on field level information and data from 26 irrigation systems in six countries: 
Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Vietnam. The study focuses on equity aspects, 
analyzing implications of alternate  irrigation  charging/ pricing methods for the poor farmers 
under various socio-economic, and land distribution conditions. The aim is to suggest charging/ 
pricing options that improve revenues/cost recovery and are pro-equity and pro-poor.  
                                                 
1 In the literature on natural resources, particularly water resources, terms water price, water charge, water fee and 
water tax are often (incorrectly) used interchangeably. In a strict sense, price is a value of a commodity determined by 
market forces. It is a payment for a commodity or service of business character and the individual can escape the price 
by not purchasing the commodity or service. On the other hand, fee and charge (which mean to the same thing) are 
compulsory contributions or payments made by a person to cover a part or all of the expenses involved in some action 
or provision of service by the public authority which while creating a common benefit, also renders a specific benefit or 
service to a person. Fee and charge is intended to cover a part or all of the cost of the service rendered and is never 
more than the cost of the service. Tax is a general compulsory payment levied upon persons to cover the expenses 
incurred in conferring common benefits upon users of a commodity or service. It is a compulsory levy and is meant for 
general purpose of state revenue raising. An individual cannot expect any specific service rendered to him by state in 
return for the tax paid by him. Broadly speaking, price is for goods of pure private nature, charge or fee are generally 
for goods with both public and private characteristics, and tax is for goods of pure public nature. More appropriate term 
for irrigation service may be fee or charge rather than price or tax. In nutshell, price is a payment of a business 
character. For charge and fee, public interest is prominent, and an individual receives specific benefit or service in 
return for charge and fee. Tax is for common benefits, and not for specific benefit to individual tax payers. Tax and 
price are on two extremes of a spectrum representing a pure public good and pure private good, respectively, and 
charge, fee or differentiated fee is somewhere in the middle of the spectrum (with fee or charge, for example, for semi-
public goods, and differentiated fee for semi-private goods). Water has characteristics of both public and private goods, 
and where it lies on the spectrum of public-private good depends on the context; in South Asia, for example, it may be 
more on semi-public good side (where terms such as fee or charge may be more relevant), on the other hand, in China, 
where it is more toward semi-private good side (where terms such as differentiated fee or even price may be relevant) 
[these distinctions are from literature on public finance, for details see Dewett and Chand 1987] 
2 Some of the efficiency related aspects are discussed in Appendix-A.   7 
The paper is organized as follows: with brief introduction and outline of the study objectives, the 
next section  provides an overview of various charging methods and identifies factors that 
influence the choice of a charging method in a particular setting, including a review of the past 
studies on the related issues. Section 3 provides a brief description of the study locations, data and 
the study methods. Section 4 outlines key characteristics of various charging methods and offers 
comparative analyses, and highlights their main strengths and limitations. This is followed by 
analysis of linkages between irrigation charge, irrigation system performance and poverty in 
section 5. Section 6 offers discussion on the suggestion options for irrigation charging.  Last 
section summarizes the study findings, draw conclusions and implications of  the main findings.  
 
Overview of Charging Methods and the Factors Influencing their Choice 
 
Seagraves and Easter (1993), Small et al (1989), Tsur and Dinar (1995), Hassan and Chaudhry 
(1998) and Johansson (2000)  and Johansson  et al. (2002)  discuss  alternate  irrigation  
charging/pricing methods in developing countries. These may be classified into following four 
categories:  
 
(1) volumetric based charges – direct charges based on measured quantities of water, 
suited to situations where value of water is very high and  water can be measured, 
however, cost of water  measurements and monitoring is generally high.;  
 
(2) time based charges – charges based on per share of flow in a canal, suited to 
situations where water is allocated/distributed on the basis of time, water flow varies 
over time, this method have some characteristics of volumetric based charges;  
 
(3) area based charges – charges based on area irrigated or cropped; this is the most 
commonly used method of charging for water. In a global survey of farmers Bos and 
Walters (1990) found that in more than 60 percent of cases water is charged on a per 
unit area basis; area based charges basically represent the case of fixed water charges; 
and  
 
(4) output or input based charges – these are indirect charges based on quantities of 
outputs produced or inputs purchased.    
 
There are a number of factors that influence the c hoice, suitability and effectiveness of a 
particular charging method in a particular location. These factors can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Water allocations and rights – in most developing countries, water rights and customs relating 
to water allocation and distribution often have evolved over centuries. Water laws generally 
decree government ownership of water resources. In most situations, surface water allocations at 
the higher level (primary and secondary levels) are done administratively based on a number of 
criteria including historical water rights, canal command areas, canal capacity, overall availability 
and supply of water, cropping patterns and socio-political considerations. At the tertiary and farm   8 
levels, water allocations are generally based on size of landholdings and available supplies of 
water; and land and water rights are generally coupled (except in China where land rights are 
decoupled from water rights). The administrative allocation of surface water supplies across 
canals or regions is controlled by the provisions of water acts and regulations. Similarly, prices 
are also set administratively, often based on socio-political criteria. Administrative allocation of 
water, coupled with administratively determined charges/prices, mean that role of charges/prices 
is changed. Under these conditions, price plays a role in the allocation of resources only if there is 
a response to price at the margin. However, the price remains important in determining the level 
of revenues generated by the authorities concerned. It should be noted that in water scarce areas, 
administrative allocation of water is basically some sort of physical rationing of water, and as 
Seagraves and Easter (1983) and Perry (2001) suggest that if water could be made equally scarce 
to all farmers (as for example under warabandi system in northwest India and Pakistan), they 
would have incentive to distribute it as well as it were priced.  
 
2. Characteristics of delivery systems – the characteristics of a delivery system also influence the 
suitability  and choice  of a particular pricing/charging method. Delivery system may be 
categorized into (a) supply based systems, and (b) demand based systems. Supply based systems 
may be further categorized into (i) rotational systems – where water is supplied to users in turns 
according to some pre-arranged schedule; and (ii) continuous flow systems  – where water 
supplies flow continuously and each farmer is free to take whatever quantity reaches his or her 
fields. The amount of water received generally depends on the location of farms along a canal. In 
the supply based systems (which characterize most large and medium scale surface irrigation 
systems in developing countries), water allocation and prices/charges are determined 
administratively. Irrigation charges are often levied based on area irrigated or area cropped. In 
these systems, even if water is charged on volumetric basis (as in some Chinese systems at the 
primary or secondary level), irrigation charges do not necessarily reflect the true value of water. 
On the other hand, in demand based systems (which characterize almost all groundwater systems 
(tubewells)), water supplies are delivered at times and in quantities as requested by users (and 
often prices are determined by market forces, although all social costs and benefits associated 
with water supply and use are not fully reflected in water prices). In these systems, user farmers 
have control over and make decisions over the volume of water to receive (regardless of whether 
volume of water is measured based on time of water flow or area irrigated).  The unique 
characteristic of the demand based system is the flexibility in operations to match supplies with 
demands. The system works best where water can be measured, and volumetric pricing/charging 
is feasible. Appropriate control and measurement structures are important for these systems. 
 
3.  Value of w ater, variability in water flows, and distribution losses – where  inter and intra 
seasonal flows  of supplies vary widely,  the  value of water may also  differ  significantly. 
Therefore, pricing/charging based on value of water may needs to be frequently changed, which 
is practically difficult to implement. Consequently, under these conditions, water is allocated 
/distributed based on proportion of flow or share, that is, time based allocation and charging. 
Also, where value of water is low, volumetric based charging may not be feasible because of 
significant costs associated with water measurements, monitoring and administration.   9 
 
4.Number of farms to be served – where number of farms to be served is very large, as is the case 
in most developing countries’ irrigation systems, there are practical difficulties in providing 
highly  differentiated services to individual farmers, requiring simple water allocation and 
charging methods. 
 
5.Social objectives – such as the desire to provide subsidies to increase production or to address 
poverty concerns also influence the choice of charging methods.  
 
6. Other factors influencing the choice of charging methods include ability to collect irrigation  
charges and transaction costs associated with collection.  
 
Highlights from the Past Studies 
 
As mentioned earlier, there is a vast amount of literature on financial and economic aspects of 
water on including water charging/pricing. However, much of the available literature is based on 
theoretical discussions, analyses from the perspectives of resource allocation efficiency and cost 
recovery, case studies on institutional dimensions of water financing and pricing, and on water 
markets. Also, most of the available related studies particularly  on pricing are for non-
agricultural/urban water use, with work offering detailed  examination of the  linkages between 
irrigation charging and poverty being very rare.  
 
This section provides a very brief review and key conclusions from recent studies on  general 
issues on irrigation water financing and pricing/ charging. For a recent comprehensive review and 
list of extended references see Johansson (2000) and Johansson et al. (2002). 
 
Small et al. 1989 undertook a detailed review of national and international literature and case 
studies  in Indonesia, Nepal, Philippines, and India on financing and charging methods for 
irrigation water. Their study discusses types of irrigation methods, institutional arrangements for 
financing irrigation, methods of charging for  irrigation,  irrigation  charge enforcement 
mechanisms, collection costs and collection efficiencies, and water use efficiencies in the selected 
locations. Major conclusions of the study are that: (1) the quality of irrigation system operation 
and management is affected not only by the amount of resources made available to operate and 
maintain systems, but by the institutional arrangements under which they are provided;.  (2) 
providing appropriate incentives to agencies responsible is important for cost effective 
management of irrigation. Financially autonomous agencies, raising their revenues from farmers’ 
payments of irrigation service fees have greater incentive to provide good irrigation service 
compared to financially dependent agencies that receive their revenues from the national treasury. 
Also, decentralized financial autonomy creates financial accountability linkages between 
irrigation managers and users; (3) most financing mechanisms used in the case study countries do 
not provide incentives for efficient use of water. The main direct financing method involves 
irrigation service fee charged based on flat rate per unit of area, sometime differentiated for crop 
type and cropping intensity. The area based fees, rather than promoting efficient water use,   10 
generally provide incentives for overuse of water by those farmers able to obtain it. Efficiency of 
water use is  related to effectiveness of agencies’ control over  distribution of supply to farmers, 
rather than the control over the demand for water through pricing mechanisms; (4) true water 
pricing, which requires water measurements and high degree of physical control over water 
distribution, is generally not found in irrigation systems characterized by large number of small 
farms on which rice is a predominant crop, as under such conditions water pricing is difficult to 
implement and costly to administer; and (5) under conditions of reasonable irrigation service fee, 
the incremental benefits derived by farmers from irrigation are adequate for them to pay the full 
O&M cost while retaining significant increase in net incomes due to irrigation.   
 
The Expert Consultation on Irrigation Water Charges (ECIWC 1986) states, (as reported in Bos 
and Walters 1990)  that “ Water charges policies are unlikely to have any significant impact on 
the efficiency with which individual farmers use water except in those extreme cases where at the 
same time: water is scarce, the irrigation systems deliver water on demand basis (response to ad 
hoc requests), and water deliveries are measured” Further it is indicated that even if charges are 
levied on volumetric basis, and farmers can control the quantity of water delivered, low charges 
will not have any significant influence on efficiency. Bos and Walters (1990) in their global 
survey of farmers (covering 8.9 million ha globally) examined the relationships between 
irrigation charges and irrigation efficiencies. Main conclusions from their analysis are that: (1) 
there are no significant influence of the structure of water charges on irrigation efficiencies, and 
efficiencies were not high where charges were levied by volume, because charges were too low to 
have significant impact (charges in almost all projects were under 10 percent of net farm income); 
(2)  irrespective of the structure of water charges,  and  there was a trend towards higher 
efficiencies with higher charges; and (3) in projects where water supply was to be lifted, the fiel d 
application efficiency and tertiary unit efficiency were significantly higher and influenced by 
built in proportional charge, and three effects: water shortage, lift of water and higher efficiency, 
were interrelated.       
 
Comparing three methods of charging for water – volumetric based charges, area based charges 
and time based charges in the context of Indus basin, Pakistan, Hassan and Chaudhry (1998) 
conclude that volumetric based charging may be efficient but is not feasible on both technical and 
financial grounds. Further, it is indicated that in crop area based method, irrigation charges are 
not linked to water use, and there are problems related to underassessment and misreporting of 
crop areas in this method of charging. They suggest that culturable command area (of farms) 
based irrigation charges (which is believed to be close proxy for volumetric charges) and time 
based charges, are better options than volumetric based or crop based irrigation charges in terms 
of efficiency of water use and cost of implementation. However, the arguments in the study are 
not founded by any rigorous analysis, and also, the study does not analyze equity implications of 
alternate charging systems.   
 
On cost–based pricing, Rogers, Bhatia and Huber (1998) suggest that the full cost of water, 
including the opportunity cost of water as well as the environmental externalities, should present   11 
the context for setting prices, and that social objectives of poverty alleviation and food security 
should be taken into consideration.  
 
Perry (2001) raises important issues in relation to charging for irrigation water, and discusses 
various options. He argues that introducing volumetric charges is difficult and unlikely to result 
in water savings within the politically feasible range of prices in developing countries. He 
indicates that lower water rates will have no impact on demand, and higher rates that will 
influence demand will be too high to be politically acceptable and will result in substantial profits 
to supplying agency. For example, the likely charge needed to cover O&M costs would be 
$0.003-0.005 per m
3, while the charge required to substantially affect demand would be much 
higher $0.02-0.05 per m
3. Therefore, a charge designed to recover O&M costs will have minimal 
efficiency impacts, and charge that will affect efficiency will be too high to be politically feasible. 
He highlights practical difficulties in pricing water due to complex nature of water as a natural 
resource (difficulty in  measuring water at the farm level, water losses, and presence of 
externalities), as a difficult economic resource (as value of water varies across time, space and 
use) and as a difficult political resource (political difficulty in raising prices). He suggests that: (a) 
many of the assumed advantages of water pricing can be achieved through physical rationing of 
water, which is easier to implement, more transparent and more readily adjusted to local 
considerations such as groundwater conditions and salt management; and (b) set water charges to 
recover full O&M costs to ensure financial sustainability of irrigation systems. However, his 
study does not provide any analysis of equity implications of recovering full O&M costs.     
 
As mentioned earlier, much of the available literature on water pricing/charging, is in the context 
of efficiency of water allocation and use, and cost recovery. While it has been recognized that 
cost recovery schemes and associated methods of charging have direct impacts o n equity and 
income distribution, empirical studies on this dimension are rare. In relation to equity aspects, 
Rhodes and Sampath (1988), and Sampath (1992) suggest that consideration of effects on income 
distribution of water pricing has merit of its own when justified on ethical grounds. Tsur and 
Dinar (1995) indicate that the majority of pricing mechanisms have little potential effect on 
income distribution when farmers are homogenous, as equity effects of pricing  are primarily 
dependent on land endowments. There are both for and against arguments in relation to irrigation 
charging/pricing with respect to equity. For example, sometime it is argued that consumers 
benefit from agricultural investments through lower food prices and so should be expected to 
share in covering the costs (Sampath 1983). Some even argue against water charges of any kind 
in less developed countries, as higher income farmers are often exempt from paying (Easter and 
Welsch 1986). On the other hand, it has also been suggested that water pricing may be used as 
effective means to re-distribute incomes especially where there are equity concerns among 
heterogeneous water users and sectors, and that water pricing may play a role in influencing 
income distribution between irrigation districts (Brill, Hochman and Zilberman 1997) as well as 
between farming and non-farming sectors (Diao and Roe 1998). Based on the extensive review of 
literature on water pricing, Johansson 2000 suggests that effect of pricing on equity and income 
distribution in developing countries should not be overlooked.  
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Study Locations, Data and Methods 
 
This study forms part of the ADB funded multi-country project on ‘Pro-poor intervention 
strategies in irrigated agriculture in Asia’ implemented by the International Water Management 
Institute (IWMI) in collaboration with national partners in six Asian countries: Bangladesh, 
China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Vietnam. These are among the top few countries where 
substantial  investments have been made in the development of large and medium scale canal 
irrigation systems, where irrigated agriculture provides livelihoods to hundreds of millions of 
rural people. According to recent FAO statistics, these countries together account for over 51 
percent of global net irrigated area and over 73 percent of net irrigated areas in Asia, with most of 
this area located in China, India and Pakistan. For this study, 26 medium and large scale irrigation 
systems, were selected from the six countries. The selected irrigation systems vary in terms of 
size, canal water supplies, groundwater use, condition of irrigation infrastructure, irrigation 
management patterns, crop productivity, level of crop diversification, land quality and size of 
landholdings, and level and structure of irrigation charging. Location of the systems and other 
related characteristics are presented in  Table 1 (for more details on  specifics of locations and 
characteristics of these systems see Hussain and Wijerathne, 2003). 
 
The study is based on both primary and secondary data. Primary data were collected from the 
selected irrigation systems through household level surveys. Consistent procedures were adopted 
for developing sampling framework and sample selection across selected systems in six countries. 
For each irrigation system, sample was drawn using a multi-stage sampling method. In the first 
stage, each selected system was purposively divided into three strata (e.g. head, middle and tail 
parts). In stage two, each of the strata was divided into a number of clusters (in irrigated areas, a 
distributary canal was taken as a cluster and in rainfed areas a village was defined as a cluster). 
One to two representative clusters were selected along each of the three reaches, head, middle and 
tail, of a system. In stage three, a sample of households was selected from each cluster. Given the 
differences and complexity of systems across countries, there were some minor variations in 
procedures adopted in each location according to local conditions, overall sampling procedures 
were fairly consistent across systems. Total sample size for surveys consisted of 5408 households 
in 26 selected systems. The selected households were interviewed with pre-tested structured 
questionnaire for gathering data and information on various aspects of household economies 
including demographics, landholdings and agriculture, irrigation, cost and returns of crop 
cultivation, household assets, employment and earnings from non-agricultural sector, credit, 
household total incomes and expenditures, and other related variables. The survey covered all 
cropping seasons during 2001-2002 agricultural year (for more details on data collection 
procedures see Hussain and Wijerathne, 2003). The study uses the following poverty headcount 
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Where yi is the income of the individual i or household i, and z is specified poverty line, and for 
Headcount Index (HCI)  parameter  ? = 0.  HCI estimates the s hare or proportion of the 
population, which is poor or whose income is below the specified poverty line. This is a measure 
of incidence of poverty.  
 
Irrigation Charging in the Selected Systems – The Context 
 
In this section, we discuss irrigation charging methods presently in practice based on data and 
information collected from the selected  irrigation systems. Systems studied in the South Asian 
countries (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan) are characterized by high degree of inequity in land 
and water distribution, with highest inequity in Pakistan. For example in Pakistan, 75 percent of 
sample households owned around 40 percent of land, and 25 percent owned 60 percent of land. 
The estimates of Gini coefficient for land across selected systems in Pakistan varied from 0.31 to 
0.56, with average value estimated at 0.49. While average per household landholding size in 
Bangladesh is relatively small, its distribution is fairly inequitable. For example, in Ganges-
Kobadak system, lower 71 percent of sample households owned 25 percent of land, middle 27 
percent owned 32 percent of land, and upper 2 percent owned 43 percent of total land area. 
Similarly, in Indonesian systems, though average land size per household is much smaller, there 
is an element of inequity in land distribution. On the other hand, land distribution in Chinese and 
Vietnamese systems is fairly equitable (basically reflecting equitable land policy followed in 
these countries, for details see Hussain and Wijerathne, 2004a, forthcoming) though average 
landholding size per household is much smaller than that in South Asian countries. Agricultural 
productivity per ha is the highest in the Chinese systems and the lowest in Pakistani systems.  
 
In all the systems studied, except those which have been transferred or where irrigation is 
managed in more participatory mode (where in most cases irrigation charges are jointly 
determined and assessed by the agency and WUAs), irrigation charges are set administratively by 
the central or provincial/state governments. Charges are set at low levels, which reflect neither the 
cost of supplying water nor the value/benefits derived from water use. Present level of irrigation 
charges, particularly in the South Asian systems, are too low to have any influence on farmers’ 
cropping decisions or water use efficiency. In these systems, irrigation charges are not linked to 
the level of services, charges are levied irrespective of the amount of irrigation water received, 
and irrespective of the quality and reliability of irrigation supplies. In all the agency managed 
systems, irrigation charging, collection and spending is highly centralized. In these systems, 
revenues generated through irrigation charges do not even cover the required O&M costs and the 
systems have to depend on public sector allocation of funds. In South Asian systems, where 
landholdings are inequitably distributed, large part of benefits of subsidies to the irrigation sector 
goes to large landholders. In the transferred systems or where there are decentralized institutional 
arrangements for irrigation management and service delivery, charge collection and spending 
mechanisms are fairly decentralized and overall performance is better than that of agency 
managed systems. 
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Table 1: Salient Features and Water Charging in Selected Irrigation Systems 
 
 






Basis of Water 
Charges  Annual Water 
Charge per 












Bangladesh  G-K 
South-western 
Bangladesh  Agency  CG  Crop area based  Tk. 1200 ($20)  4.46  5-15  skewed 
  Pabna 
West-central 
Bangladesh  Agency  CG  Crop area based  Tk. 1296 ($22)  7.51  9  skewed 
India  NSLC 
Andhra 
Pradesh/Krishnia 
River- Upstream  Transferred  SG  Crop area based  Rs.500 ($10)  1.91  40-50  
moderately 
skewed 
  KDS 
Andhra 
Pradesh/Krishnia 
River- Downstream  Transferred  SG  Crop area based  Rs.500 ($10)  1.57  82 
moderately 
skewed 
  Halali  Madhya Pradesh  Transferred  SG  Crop area based  Rs.500 ($10)  3.09  33  fairly skewed 
  Harsi  Madhya Pradesh  Transferred  SG  Crop area based  Rs.500 ($10)  4.33  21  fairly skewed 
Pakistan  9-R  Upper Jehlum Canal 
Agency  PG 
Crop area based  Rs. 275 ($4.6)  2.94  99 
moderately 
skewed 
  10-R  Upper Jehlum Canal 
Agency  PG 
Crop area based  Rs.411($6.9)  2.09  99 
moderately 
skewed 
  13-R  Upper Jehlum Canal 
Agency  PG 
Crop area based  Rs. 635($10.6)  2.06  80 
moderately 
skewed 
  14-R  Upper Jehlum Canal 
Agency  PG 
Crop area based  Rs.531($8.8)  2.41  80 
moderately 
skewed 
  Kakowal  Upper Jehlum Canal 
Agency  PG 
Crop area based  Rs.559($9.3)   3.51  80 
moderately 
skewed 
  Phalia  Upper Jehlum Canal 
Agency  PG 
Crop area based  Rs. 529($8.8)  2.31  80 
moderately 
skewed 
  Lalian  Lower Jehlum Canal 
Agency  PG 
Crop area based  Rs. 338($5.6)  2.84  87 
moderately 
skewed 
  Khadir  Lower Jehlum Canal 
Agency  PG 
Crop area based  Rs. 414($6.9)  3.90  87 
highly 
skewed 
  Khikhi  Lower Chenab Canal 
Agency  PG 
Crop area based  Rs. 472($7.9)  1.66  94 
highly 
skewed 
  Hakra-4  Hakra System  Transferred  PG  Crop area based  Rs. 274($4.6)  1.72  91 
highly 
skewed   15 








based  Y556/($67)  5.08  80  fairly equal 






PG  Cultivated area 
based 
Y489/ha ($59)  5.17  80  fairly equal 
  PID-HP 
Henan Province- 




PG  Cultivated area 
based 
Y279 ($34)  2.35  80  fairly equal 
  LID-HP 
Henan Province- 




PG  Cultivated area 
based 
Y212 ($26)  1.83  80  fairly equal 
Vietnam  Nam Duang  Red River Delta 
Village 
cooperatives, 
IDMCs  PPC  Crop area based  VD917135 ($58)*  4.6   85-95  fairly equal 
 
Nam Thach 
Han  North Central Region 
Village 
cooperatives, 
IDMCs  PPC  Crop area based  VD969700($61)*  6.3   99  fairly equal 
Indonesia  Klambu Kiri  Central Java  Agency  WUAs  Multiple criteria  $6-11  0.8 to 1  -  skewed 
  Glapan  Central Java  Agency  WUAs 
Multiple criteria 
$4-16  0.8 to 4.3  -  skewed 
  Kalibawang  Yogyakarta  Transferred  WUAs 
Multiple criteria 
$13-20  0.6 to 2.2  95  fairly equal 
  Krogowanan  Central Java  Transferred  WUAs 
Multiple criteria 
$1-7  0.2 to 0.6  -  fairly equal 
Notes: IDMCs: Irrigation and Drainage Management Companies.  
G-K = Ganges Kobadak; NSLC = Nagarjuna Sagar Left Bank Canal; KDS = Krishna Delta Systems; WID-NP =  Weining Irrigation District in Ningxia province; QID-NP = 
Qingtongxia irrigation district in Ningxia Province; PID-HP = People’s Victory Irrigation District in Henan province; LID-HP = Liuyuankou Irrigation District in Henan province.; 
CG = Central Government, SG = State Government, PG =Provincial Government, WUA= ,Water User Association, PPC =Province People’s Committee; 
* these figures are based on cost of full irrigation (fee for partial irrigation is lower). Average rice yield per ha (for both spring and summer crops) for Nam Duang (ND) and Nam 
Thach Han (NTH) systems are 8766 kg and 9241 kg, and average fee for full irrigation for ND is 209kg/ha for spring and 194kg/ha for summer (total 404 kg/year), and for NTH 
average fee for full irrigation is 290 kg/ha per season (total 580 kg/ha/year). Estimated average local price for paddy is VD2270/kg for ND and VD1672/kg for NTH systems. 
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In the studied systems in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, irrigation charging methods are fairly 
similar. The level and structure of irrigation charges is determined by the state/provincial 
governments. Irrigation charges at the farm level are levied based on area cultivated/cropped, 
crop type, crop condition, and season (Rabi/Kharif). In each season, irrigation charge assessment 
at the filed level is undertaken by irrigation/revenue department officials. Even, in most of the 
transferred systems (in Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Hakra-4 in Pakistani Punjab) irrigation 
charges are determined by public authorities while assessment and collection is either jointly 
undertaken by government officials and WUAs or in some cases by WUAs (as in Hakra-4 R). 
Within a state or p rovince, irrigation charges are levied uniformly across canal commands, 
irrespective of the amount of water delivered to a canal command. For example, in Lalian and 
Khadir systems in Pakistani  Punjab, average amount of canal water applied per ha for wheat 
during rabi season is estimated at 1458 m
3, and 465m
3, respectively, (with significant head to tail 
variations), however, seasonal  irrigation  charge is uniform in both systems. Groundwater 
contributes 55 percent and 89 percent of total water applied per ha, in the above two systems, 
respectively (see Hussain et al. 2003), and those who supplement canal water with groundwater 
are fully liable for canal water charges. Irrigation charges are generally higher for high water 
consuming crops such as rice, and low for less water consuming crops such as wheat although 
differences are not significantly large enough to affect farmers cropping decisions. Variations in 
canal water allocations are not clearly reflected in the charging structure. At present, irrigation 
charges are remitted to the government and there is no direct link between funds collected and 
funds spent on operations and maintenance. Unlike  in  Vietnam and China,  canal  irrigation  
charges in South Asian systems are not differentiated by location across  and within canal 
commands, or by level of service (full or partial irrigation) or level of productivity. Overall 
irrigation charges are low, both because of low level of charges and/or poor collection rates, and 
the governments subsidizes irrigation in these countries. 
 
While water allocation/ distribution in the South Asian systems is based on size of landholdings, 
irrigation charges are levied based on farm area cropped. This has implications both for income 
distribution and for cost recovery, particularly in systems where average landholdings are fairly 
large and land distribution is highly inequitable (as in almost all Pakistani systems) and cropping 
intensity is low. Assuming both small farm (say of 1 ha size) and a large farm (say of 20 ha size) 
have same water entitlement per ha (as for example, under warabandi type of systems,  where 
water is distributed across farms such that scarcity or abundance of water are equitably shared 
across farms, although in practice large head-tail inequities prevail in most surface systems), and 
say per ha water supply is 2500 m
3 (with small farm receiving 2500 m
3 and large farm 50,000 
m
3), and assuming per season cropping intensity is 100 percent for small farms and 80 percent for 
large farms, and average per hectare irrigation charge (crop area weighted) is Rs 100. For each 
hectare of land (or for each 2500 m
3 ) small farmer would pay Rs. 100, and large farmer would 
pay Rs. 80. Under such a system, large farmers are not charged for water allocated to 20 percent 
of landholding that was not cropped due to a variety of reasons. Since, often per ha canal water 
supplies are less than required, this 20 percent may be used to increase per ha supplies on 80 
percent of the cropped area. Under this system, total amount collected from the two farms would 
be Rs. 1700 (Rs.100+Rs.1600). However, if irrigation charges are linked to size of landholdings   17 
(which is fair as water distribution is based on landholding size), total amount collected from the 
two farms would be Rs. 2100 (Rs.100 +Rs. 2000), an increase of Rs. 400. The current system, 
therefore, is not only pro-rich (or anti-poor), it reduces the total amount of funds that could be 
generated without any increase in irrigation charges. Also, irrigation charges are differentiated by 
crop type, that is, higher irrigation charges for high water consuming crops and vice versa. This 
type of irrigation  charging structure appears to be appealing, however, there are three major 
issues: (1) water allocation to a farm is fixed based on size of landholdings, and not based on crop 
type. Under warabandi type of system, a farmer growing rice or cotton would receives an equal 
amount of water per hectare of farm; (2) differences in  irrigation charges for various crops are 
generally not significant enough to affect farmers copping decisions; and (3) transaction costs of 
assessments of irrigation charges based on crop type, and of mis-reporting etc are often high. 
These issues provide justification for a more simple charging structure, that is, irrigation charges 
independent of crop type, and area cropped simply based on size of landholdings. 
 
In Indonesia, multiple criteria are used in determining irrigation charges at the tertiary level 
including cropped/irrigated area, crop type, crop productivity, location, level of service and users’ 
capacity to pay, especially in transferred systems (with more decentralized institutional 
arrangements). Variations in canal water allocations are implicitly accounted for in charging 
structure. Farmers using more water by irrigating more area or by growing water intensive crops 
or achieving higher productivity have to pay more, introducing an element of equity in irrigation 
charging methods. Additional criterion of farmers’ capacity to pay introduces poverty concerns 
into the charging methods, with the poor farmers paying relatively less than the non-poor farmers. 
Under multiple criteria based charging  method (as being practiced in the transferred systems) 
structure of charging is such that charges are linked to water supplied/used, and it accounts for 
poverty concerns. The key issue for cost recovery in these systems is the level of irrigation 
charges. 
 
In the Chinese and Vietnamese irrigation systems studied, landholdings are though small, their 
distribution is highly equitable. Water distribution across farms and across head and tail reaches 
tends to be relatively more equitable in these systems than those in South Asian systems. At the 
system level, water is allocated based on command area, cropping patterns, canal capacity etc, 
and irrigation charges are related to water allocated to a system, and irrigation charges vary by 
system. At the farm level, water is distributed based on size of landholdings, and  irrigation  
charges are based on area cropped. Since average landholding size is small, overall cropping 
intensity is high across farms (for example, average cropping intensity across systems in China 
varies from 152 to 198 percent; in Vietnam it varies from 198 to 209 percent, see Hussain and 
Wijerathne 2003 for details).   Because of small sizes of landholdings, entire farm areas are 
cultivated intensively and cropping intensities tends to be similar across farms. In a season, land 
use intensity (i.e. cultivated area/farm are) and cropping or cultivation intensity (i.e. cropped 
area/cultivated or farm area) tend to be similar.  Given that land use intensities and cropping 
intensities tend to be similar, it does not make much difference if irrigation charges are based on 
size of landholdings or land use or cropping intensity. Also, since water distribution across head, 
middle or tail tends to be equitable within a system, application of uniform irrigation  charges   18 
within a system seems plausible. What is important for cost recovery in these systems is the level 
of irrigation charges. 
 
In the Chinese systems studied, level and structure of irrigation charges is determined by the local 
water resources bureaus under the guidelines from the provincial governments. At the field level, 
irrigation charge is based on area irrigated and in some cases time period to irrigate the fields. 
Irrigation charge appears to be related to the cost of O&M and overall cost of supplying water. In 
those Chinese systems, where water can be measured at primary or secondary levels, water is 
charged on volumetric basis, with same charge per unit of water for each user group in a canal 
command. Variations in canal water allocations are clearly reflected in charging structures, that 
is, amount paid for irrigation charges is directly proportional to amount of water received.  
 
In the studied systems in Vietnam, irrigation is charged based on the level of output produced, 
charges vary across systems, and are differentiated by the level of service, that is, households 
receiving partial irrigation service pay less. IDMCs and cooperatives sign water delivery and 
water fee contracts, and charging and spending is partially decentralized.  
 
At the lower/tertiary level, in both Vietnamese and Chinese systems, water is charged based on 
area cropped/irrigated, season, location and level of service (full or partial irrigation). Those users 
receiving full irrigation pay more than those receiving only partial irrigation. Similarly, those 
growing more water intensive crops generally pay more than those growing less water intensive 
crops. Implicitly, irrigation charges are linked to amount of water received/used, both directly at 
primary or secondary level (volumetric) and indirectly at the tertiary level. Partly, this is due to 
more decentralized  irrigation  charging systems. Overall, there is an element of equity built in 
irrigation charging method. Detailed characteristics of charging methods in practice in the studied 
systems are outlined in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
Table 2:Characteristics of Water Charging Methods in Selected Systems in Asia and South   
Studied Systems  Characteristics of Water Charging Methods 
South Asia (Bangladesh, 
India and Pakistan) 
?  Level and structure of  irrigation charges is determined by 
state/provincial government. 
?  There is no volumetric based charging. 
?   Irrigation  charges are based on area cultivated/cropped, and 
differentiated by crop type, crop condition and crop season 
(dry/wet). Charges are generally higher for high water consuming 
crops such as rice, and low for less water consuming crops such 
as wheat. 
?  Irrigation charges are uniform across canal commands within a 
province or state, irrespective of the target amount of water 
delivered to a canal command. 
?  A crop irrigated partially from surface water and partially from 
groundwater is fully liable for canal irrigation charges. 
?  Level of irrigation charges is generally too low to affect farmers 
cropping decision.   
?  Level of irrigation charges is low and government provides 
subsidies.  
?  Irrigation charge collection and assessment is undertaken by   19 
government officials. 
?  Irrigation charges constitute 2 to 7 percent of gross value of 
production per ha. 
?  Collection rate varies across systems, with lowest rate of 5 to 15 
percent in Bangladeshi systems, 20 to 80 percent in Indian 
systems, and 80 to 99 percent in Pakistani systems. 
?  Collected amount is deposited in treasury, and O& M funds are 
allocated from annual budgetary allocations for the sector.   
?  Irrigation charges are not linked to O&M cost or cost of 
supplying water 
?  Irrigation charges are not linked to level of service, charges are 
levied irrespective of amount of water received, and regardless of 
full irrigation or partial irrigation, quality and reliability of water 
supplies 
?  Within systems, uniform charges are applied to all locations in a 
system, and for all socio-economic groups. 
?  In the transferred systems, WUAs still depend on government 
budgetary allocations 
?  Irrigation charge system is highly centralized, especially in 
systems managed by agencies. 
?  In the transferred systems (India and Pakistan), 40 to 50 percent 
of funds collected through irrigation charges are to be given to 
WUAs for maintenance. However, in most systems, this 
mechanism is yet to be implemented.   
Indonesia  ?  Level and structure of irrigation charges is jointly determined by 
the agency and WUAs. 
?  In the transferred systems, WUAs, and WUAF play greater role 
in determining the level and structure of irrigation charges. 
?  There is no volumetric based charging. 
?  Irrigation charges are based on area cropped/irrigated, cropping 
intensity, crop type, availability of water supply and its reliability, 
O&M requirements, farmers satisfaction and farmers capacity to 
pay. 
?  Interestingly, irrigation charges are also differentiated by location 
(head, middle and tail), with lower charges in low productivity 
areas. 
?  Irrigation charges consist of several components including 
irrigation service fee (around Rp.15000/ha/year), development 
fee, material and labor. 
?  If amount collected is insufficient, government provides the 
required funds. 
?  Irrigation charges are collected b y WUA staff from farmers 
individually or during WUA meetings. 
?  Administrative cost of irrigation charges collection varies from 5 
to 15 percent. 
?  Amount collected is deposited to WUAs treasure and WUAs 
bank account. 
?  In the transferred systems, WUAF plays important role in the 
collection of irrigation charges and use of collected funds at the 
secondary canal level. 
?  Irrigation charges are partially linked to O&M and level of 
service. 
?  In the transferred systems, overall collection rate is higher. For 
example in  Kalibawang system, collection rate has increased   20 
from 59 percent in 1998/99 (before transfer) to 79 percent in 
1999/00 (after transfer) and further increased to 90 percent in 
2000-01. 
?  In the transferred systems, where WUAs are functioning well, 
such as in schemes in Kalibawang system, collection rate is 95 
to100 percent. 
?  Overall, irrigation charging system is fairly decentralized.    
Vietnam  ?  Level and structure of  irrigation charges is determined by 
provincial government. 
?  There is no volumetric based charging. 
?  Irrigation charges are based on  crop type, cropping season 
(spring/summer), and crop output. 
?  Irrigation charges are also differentiated by level of service i.e. 
partial or full irrigation, with households receiving partial 
irrigation paying less charges. 
?  Irrigation charges vary across systems. IDMC and cooperatives 
sign water delivery –water fee contract. In Nam Duang system, 
for example, irrigation charge is set as follows: 
 
          - 209 kg of rice /ha for spring rice for full irrigation,  
          - 181 kg/ha for spring rice for partial irrigation,  
          - 195 kg of rice/ha for summer rice for full irrigation,  
          - 146 kg/ha for partial irrigation, and  
          - 80-90 kg of rice/ha for upland crop. 
 
?  Cooperatives collect irrigation charges, and administrative cost of 
fee collection is 5-6 percent. 
?  Collection rate is fairly high (85 to 99 percent). 
?  Amount collected through irrigation charges is main source of 
incomes for IDMCs, where amount collected is generally not 
sufficient for O&M, provincial government provides funds. 
?  In a way, irrigation charges are partially linked to O&M costs and 
level of service. 
?  Irrigation charge system is partially decentralized. 
China  ?  Level and structure of irrigation charges is determined by local 
water resources bureaus (county/township) under the guidelines 
provided by the provincial and central governments. 
Consequently, there is significant spatial variation in level and 
structure of irrigation charges. 
?  In some systems,  volumetric based  irrigation  charges are 
implemented at the main canal level (where water can be 
measured). 
?  At the farm level, irrigation charges are mostly based on area 
irrigated or in some cases based on time period to irrigate a filed, 
or in few cases based on a number of members in a household. 
?  In Ningxia province, three part irrigation charging system is in 
practice: (1)  first part is volumetric water  price measured at 
outlets of the main or branch canals and is set at a level that is 
supposed to cover the variable costs associated with the supply of 
water (including staff salaries and operation and maintenance of 
main and branch canals)  – and since 2000, this is set equal to  
0.012 yuan/m
3; (2) second part consists of local water 
maintenance and management fee set at 6 Yuan/mu (which 
cannot exceed 90 Yuan/ha) [1 ha=15 mu] ; and (3) third part is 
labor discounted fee (used for irrigation districts maintenance   21 
work) set at 4 Yuan. 
?  Amount collected on volumetric basis (first part) is deposited to 
the irrigation district’s government and is used for O&M of main 
canals and staff salaries. Of the amount collected through local 
maintenance and management fee (second part), 40 percent goes 
to County Water Resources Bureau, and 60 percent to Township 
Water Resources Bureau, and is used for facility maintenance and 
staff salaries at these levels. 
?  In Ningxia, fee collection procedures vary across villages: 
farmers to village collectives (or water user associations where 
they exist or contractors) to township governments and then to 
irrigation district government. In some cases, water user 
associations and contractors collect fee from farmers and directly 
deposit to irrigation districts. 
?   On the other hand, irrigation charges in Henan province are 
based on cropped area: Paddy areas  – 22 Yuan/mu; d ry and 
gravity irrigation areas – 12 Yuan/mu; and lift irrigation areas – 7 
Yuan/mu. 
?  Irrigation charges are differentiated by location. Water charges 
are generally higher in upper reaches of the systems (where share 
of rice area is higher) than in the lower reaches.  Since water 
charge for rice is higher than that for dry crops, overall water 
charges are higher in the upstream areas. 
?  In the studied systems in Ningxia and Henan, water charge 
collection rate is over 80 percent. Collection rate is higher where 
private contractors and WUAs are operating at the local level, as 
they tend to cut deliveries in case of non-payment of charges. 
?  Irrigation charges appear to be related to cost of O&M, and  
overall cost of supplying water, and relative water scarcity. 
Irrigation charges in Ningxia (located upstream of YRB, with 
more water supplies, and relatively less cost of supplying water) 
are lower than in Henan province.  
?  In the  systems, where water management reforms are being 
implemented through formation of WUAs or by bringing private 
contractors/managers, performance of systems is generally better. 




Each of the  irrigation  charging methods described earlier  has its own  set of strengths and 
limitations. Some of the identified strengths and limitations of charging methods in the studied 
systems are outlined in  Table 3. As is clear from the table, crop-based charging in the South 
Asian systems have few strengths with many limitations. Output-based charging in Vietnam, and 
two part-charging in China, through relatively better than crop based charging, also have their 
own limitations.  
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Table 3: Strengths and Limitations of Alternate Water Charging Methods 




– differentiated by 
crop type and 
cropping season 
[South Asia] 






crop type and 
cropping season 
[Vietnam] 
Method -3  
Multiple Criteria based 
irrigation charges – crop 
area, productivity, location, 
level of service, farmers’ 
capacity to pay [Indonesia –
transferred systems] 
Method – 4  
Two/multi-part charging system   
Part 1 – Volumetric based 
irrigation charges – based on per 
cubic meter at the main canal level 
Part 2 – Crop/cultivated area based 
charges at lower levels  [China] 
 
Strengths         
1. Irrigation charges are differentiated by 
type of crop grown, higher water charges 
for high water consuming crops 
+  +  +  + 
2. Irrigation charges can be 
differentiated by season, with higher 
charges in dry season 
+  +  +  + 
3.Transaction cost of seasonal irrigation  
charge assessment and collection is 
lower in transferred systems where these 
responsibilities are entrusted to WUAs 
+  +  +  + 
4. The charging method is only partially 
flexible 
  +     
5. The charging method is fairly  flexible 
(in transferred systems) 
    +   
6. The charging method only partially 
accounts for farmers capacity to pay 
  +     
7. The charging method fully accounts 
for farmers capacity to pay 
    +   
8. Implicitly, irrigation charges are not 
uniform across systems. It accounts for 
locational differences in productivity 
that may be due to differences in 
locational availability and access to 
  +  +  +   23 
water 
9. Irrigation charges reflect benefits 
derived from water use 
  +  +  + 
10.Seasonal assessment of crop areas 
and productivity can be made based on 
last five year average of crop outputs 
  +     
11.Administrative cost of irrigation 
charge assessment and collection is low 
in the transferred systems 
    +   
12. The charging method helps generate 
funds for management and maintenance 
of systems at primary level as well as at 
secondary level 
      + 
13. The charging method can facilitate 
development of markets for canal water, 
canal water wholesaling at the main 
canal level 
      + 
14. The charging method encourages 
local level authorities/ organizations to 
save water, given the incentives to 
managers or contractors 
      + 
15. Easy in implementation, and cost of 
monitoring and administration is low    +       
Limitations (-) 
       
Transaction cost of seasonal assessment 
of areas cultivated/cropped and of 




     
The  charging method is complex as it 
requires seasonal assessments and large 
amount of record keeping. 
 
- 
     
It is easily subject to abuse through 
underestimation of areas cropped, and  - 
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mis-recoding of the crop type. 
 
It penalizes farmers who supplement 




     
Variations in canal water allocations are 




     
Irrigation  charges are administratively 
set, generally at low level, which do not 
reflect value of water or the cost of 
supplying water.  
 
- 
     
Irrigation charges are uniform across 
locations (head, middle and tail), 
charges are levied irrespective of level 
of service provided. 
 
- 
     
The charging method does not account 
for locational differences in 
productivity that may be due to 
locational inequity in water distribution. 
 
- 
     
The charging method does not account 
for farm or landholding size or socio-
economic groups, which may have 
strong equity implications.  
 
- 
     
Irrigation charges are not linked to 
amount of water supplied or quality of 
water, and do not provide any incentive 
for efficiency in water use. 
 
- 
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Irrigation charges are not linked to farm 




     
Irrigation charge does not induce 
efficient use  -  -  - 
 
The charging method does not account 
for farm or landholding size or socio-
economic groups, which may have 
strong equity implications. 
 
-  - 
   
Irrigation charges are not linked to 
amount of water supplied or quality of 
water, and do not provide any incentives 
for efficiency in water use. 
 
-  - 
   
Administrative cost of water charge 
assessment and collection is high in non-
transferred agency managed systems  - 
  - 
 
Volumetric based irrigation charges can 
be implemented only where water 
measurements can be easily done 
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As shown in Table 1 and further discussed in Table 2, in the South Asian systems studied, the 
level of irrigation charge varies from US$4.6/ha to US$22/ha. While the charge level is the 
highest in Bangladeshi systems, collection rate is very low (5-15 percent). Irrigation charges in 
the Indian systems have recently been increased to US$ 10/ha (which constitute 1.6 to 4.3 percent 
of gross value of product), with collection rate varying significantly across systems from 21 
percent to 81 percent. In Pakistani systems, irrigation charges vary from US$4.6/ha to 
US$10.6/ha (constituting 1.7 to 3.9 percent of gross value of product), and overall collection rate 
is higher (80-99 percent) than that in Bangladeshi and Indian systems. In Indonesia, irrigation 
charges vary from US$1/ha to US$20/ha, and collection rate is fairly high, especially in  the 
transferred systems. On the other hand, irrigation charges in China and Vietnam are much higher 
than those in Indonesia and South Asian systems. In China, irrigation charges vary from US$26 
to US$67/ha (1.8 to 5.2 percent of gross value of product), with average collection rate of 80 
percent. Similarly in Vietnam, where irrigation is charged based on crop output, the charge level 
is fairly high at US$58 to US$61/ha, (constituting 4.6 and 6.3 percent of gross value of product), 
and overall collection rate is also high (85 to 99 percent). 
 
Irrigation Charging, Irrigation Performance and Poverty 
 
In this section, we examine how the level of irrigation charge is linked to irrigation performance 
and poverty. Further, we demonstrate with empirical evidence on how charging structure matters 
under conditions of inequitable land and water distribution. We first look at the reasons on why 
irrigation charges are kept at low levels (particularly in the South Asian countries)  and  then 
analyze their implications for system performance and poverty. 
 
Irrigation Charge Level 
 
Quite often four reasons are put forward  as justifications for keeping  irrigation charges at  low 
level . These are:  
 
a)   affordability and willingness to pay  –  in the S outh Asian systems where there  is 
relatively higher incidence of poverty and food insecurity, it is often assumed that most 
small and poor farmers cannot afford to pay for irrigation, therefore, charges should be 
set at low levels;  
b)   political sensitivity – raising irrigation  charges is generally considered to be politically 
difficult;  
 
c)    positive externalities of irrigation impacts –  it is generally perceived that large part of 
benefits of  irrigation  are enjoyed by the society as a whole, therefore, consumers (in 
addition to producers) of agricultural produce should also contribute or in other words, 
sector should continue receiving public sector subsidies, and finally    27 
d)   public good nature of irrigation water –  that is,  irrigation water is viewed as public 
good, implying that the public sector should have greater role in provision of irrigation, 
including in financing for irrigation. These concerns continue to dominate perceptions of 
those who support low irrigation charges.  
 
On the other hand, low charges are often criticized on the argument that they tend to create 
financial dependence of the sector and have negative influence on irrigation system performance. 
The following points summarize the major grounds and the basic reasons on why and how low 
charge level adversely affects irrigation performance and service delivery and how it could be 
disadvantageous to the poor. Low irrigation service charges leads to:  
 
a)  Inadequate funding and neglect of maintenance:  when irrigation charger are low, 
revenue and funds available for i rrigation management are low, and the sector have to 
depend on financial allocations from the public sector which are often inadequate to carry 
out necessary operations, maintenance and management. Consequently  maintenance is 
neglected, infrastructure condition deteriorates,  and  overall availability and access to 
water is reduced;  
b)  Lack of incentives to improve on service delivery: M anagers and service providers, 
receiving large part of funds from central agencies/treasury, have little or no incentives to 
spend funds efficiently, and deliver high quality services; users paying low charges feel 
they have little entitlement, and there are little incentives for them to demand for 
improvements in service delivery; and accountability linkages in terms of spending and 
service delivery between managers/ service providers and users remain weak. As a result, 
irrigation service delivery continues to be poor and system performance in terms of water 
use efficiency and productivity remains low. In turn, poor irrigation performance reduces 
access to water, particularly of the poor farmers and those having locational 
disadvantages, with adverse impacts on their livelihoods. In other words, poor service 
delivery and low irrigation charge create vicious circle of poor irrigation performance, 
and reduces anti-poverty impacts of irrigation (see World Bank (1999), Hussain and 
Biltonen, 2002 for details)     
c)  Lack of incentives to use water efficiently: When irrigation charges are low, there are no 
incentives for users to use water efficiently and avoid wasteful use of water, resulting in 
reduced overall availability and access to water. Those having locational advantage tend 
to grab more than their due share (especially in settings where water rights are not clearly 
defined and/or effectively enforced), not only they use it in unsustainable manner, they 
deprive others, particularly the poor and the weaker. On the contrary, where irrigation 
charges are high, farmers use water carefully and benefit from each drop of water. For   28 
example, in most Chinese systems, irrigation charge is fairly high, and at the farm level 
water is used relatively effectively and the productivity per drop of water is also high.  
d)  Low charge policy worsens income disparity: In settings where there is greater inequity 
in distribution of land and water (as in most South Asian systems), low charge policy 
applied uniformly to all socio-economic groups worsens income and resource disparity 
between the poor and the non-poor as large part of the benefits of subsidise to the sector 
goes to large landholders. 
e)  Other aspects: Low charge policy and financial dependence on public sector agencies 
may also affect collection and spending efficiencies. It should be noted that, for irrigation  
charge policy, not only the level of irrigation charge is important, the structure of charge, 
and the collection and spending mechanisms and associated institutional arrangements 
are also equally important. 
 
We examine here whether some of the reasons outlined above are supported with field level data 
and information. As shown in Figure 1, in those systems where irrigation charges are low, overall 
performance of the systems in terms of productivity per ha and water use efficiency is also low. 
For example, water use efficiency (defined as the ratio of crop water requirements and total 
inflow into the canal system) in Pakistani systems varies from as low as 28 percent to 71 percent. 
In general, in the low performing systems where agricultural productivity is low, the incidence of 
poverty is high. On the other hand, where systems are well managed and overall performance is 
high, the incidence of poverty is also low. Of course, poverty is an outcome of many complex 
factors, but agricultural productivity is one of the key determinants of poverty, particularly so in 
those settings where households and communities depend for their livelihoods  mainly  on 
agriculture. Low level of irrigation charges, leads to overall poor system performance,  and 
reduces the anti-poverty impacts of irrigation. 
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Further, we quantify the relationships of irrigation charge level , irrigation performance, and 
poverty, through econometric estimations. We model  irrigation performance and poverty in the 
following equations, where irrigation charge level is linked to poverty indirectly through its 
impacts on system performance which is one of the key parameters in poverty equation. In 
equation 1, performance of irrigation systems is modeled as a function of management type and 
irrigation charge level. In equation 2, poverty headcount is modeled as a function of irrigation 
performance, share of non-crop income in household’s total income, land distribution structure 
and family size. The results of the estimated equations are presented below.  
 
PERF   =   303.94 + 217.26 MGT + 12.01 CHRG          (1) 
    (4.08)    (1.96)   ( 4.17) 
    [ n = 26, def = 23,  and R
2 = 0.62] 
 
 
POVI  =   81.94  - 0.0196 PERF  - 0.49 SNCI  - 5.36 LDIST + 3.72 FSIZE  (2) 
    (3.57)    (-2.24)   (-3.071)   (-1.84)    (2.03) 
    [ n = 26, def = 21,  and R
2 = 0.94] 
 
where   PERF = performance of irrigation  is  defined in terms of gross value of product per 
hectare [$/ha];  
MGT =  management type dummy [ 0= agency management and 1 = 
transferred/participatory management] ; 
  CHRG  = level of water charges [$/ha] 
  POVI  = poverty headcount Index (income based) [%]   
PERFe  = estimated value of productivity in equation (1) [$/ha] 
  SNCI  = average share of non-crop income in total income [%] 
LDIST = land distribution index (index varies from 1 to 6, with 1 indicating skewed land 
distribution and 6 indicating fairly equitable distribution) 
   FSIZE  = average family size [number]. 
 
Figures in parenthesis are t -values. The estimated coefficients indicate the significance of 
variables affecting performance and poverty. The coefficients of all the specified variables carry 
expected signs, and are significant. Management type and level of irrigation charges are 
significant positive determinants of irrigation system performance, indicating that performance of 
the systems is better where institutional arrangements are decentralized for participatory irrigation 
management and where irrigation charges are higher compared to those systems which are 
agency managed and  where irrigation  charges are low. Impact of irrigation charge level on 
performance is even greater than that of management type. Performance, in turn, as expected, is a 
significant negative determinant of poverty i.e. poverty incidence is low in systems with better 
performance and vice versa. Negative and significant coefficients of household non-crop income 
share and land distribution variable, and positive significant coefficient of family size indicate 
that these variables influence poverty in a significant way. The implication of the above analysis 
is that irrigation service charge level influences system performance, which in turn, adversely 
affects the poor and overall poverty in the systems
3. 
                                                 
3 We also modeled irrigation performance, management type, irrigation charge and poverty relationships (a) in a 
Recursive modeling framework using estimated values of system performance variable (from equation 1 into equation   30 
 
However, the magnitude of adverse impacts on poverty varies depending on the distribution 
structure of land and water resources. In those settings, where there is relatively greater inequity 
in land and water (as in the South Asian systems), low irrigation charges and lower than required 
operation and maintenance (O&M) of the systems and the resulting poor performance of the 
systems greatly affect the poor small farmers. Under these settings, not only the level of irrigation 
charges is important, the structure of irrigation charges has strong implications for revenue 
generation and income distribution. 
 
Irrigation Charging Structure 
 
Further, we provide an empirical evidence on the implications of charging structure for the poor 
for systems characterized by high inequities in land and water distribution  using data from 
Pakistani systems. The analysis here is based on data collected through household level surveys 
from 891 farm households from 10 distributaries in four large surface irrigation systems in the 
upper Indus basin (namely, Upper Jehlum Canal, Lower Jehlum Canal, Lower Chenab Canal and 
Hakra systems). The survey covers the period 2001-2002 agricultural year. 
 
As shown in Table 4, average cropping intensity varies significantly across farm size categories, 
with highest cropping intensity of 181 percent on smallest farm size category and lowest cropping 
intensity of 115 percent on largest farm size category. Overall, average cropping intensity for all 
farm size categories is 148 percent, and it varies inversely with farm size categories. There are  
only marginal differences in average cropping intensities across poor and non-poor groups in 
aggregate terms. However, disaggregated analysis shows that average cropping intensities for the 
poor small farmers are relatively less than that of non-poor small  farmers. Also, n ote that 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 below), and (b) in a single equation using irrigation charge variable directly into poverty equation (equation 4) but 
excluding performance variable as performance and charge level are highly coordinated (as shown in equation 1). The 
estimation results are presented in equations 3 and 4. All estimated coefficients carry expected signs and almost all are 
significant.  The general conclusion from all the four estimated equations is that irrigation charge has positive 
relationship with performance and negative relationship with poverty.  
 
POVI  =   85.11  - 0.0097 PERFe  - 0.47 SNCI  - 8.25 LDIST + 3.63 FSIZE…….(3) 
    (3.29)    (-1.01)     (-2.49)      (-2.88)    (1.78) 
    [ n = 26, def = 21,  and R
2 = 0.85] 
 
POVI  =   76.96  - 0.21 CHARGE  - 0.42 SNCI  - 7.69 LDIST + 3.78 FSIZE ……(4) 
    (3.29)    (-1.01)     (-2.49)         (-2.88)  (1.78) 
    [ n = 26, def = 21,  and R
2 = 0.93] 
 
where   PERF = performance of irrigation defined in terms of gross value of product per hectare [$/ha];  
MGT = management type dummy [0= agency management and 1 = transferred/participatory management] ; 
  CHRG   = level of water charges [$/ha] 
  POVI  = poverty headcount Index (income based) [%]   
PERFe   = estimated value of productivity in equation (1) [$/ha] 
  SNCI  = average share of non-crop income in total income [%] 
LDIST  = land distribution index (index varies from 1 to 6, with 1 indicating skewed land distribution and 6      
indicating fairly equitable distribution) 
   FSIZE  = average family size [number]. 
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landholdings size and poverty are inversely related, and the probability of small farmers of being 
poor is significantly high compared to that for large landholders.    
 
 
Table 4: Cropping Intensity, Water Charges for canal Water and Groundwater, and GVP 












































< 1 ha  181  440  4555  4995  19262  3.32  30.1  10.35 
1.1 to <3 ha  156  439  4038  4477  21552  2.63  22.0  9.21 
3.1 to <5 ha  148  432  3549  3980  22156  2.41  17.9  8.22 
5.1to < 10  ha  133  385  3209  3594  22198  2.25  16.5  8.34 
10 ha and above  115  367  2779  3146  25013  2.18  15.3  7.58 
All  148  420  3707  4127  21909  2.53  20.2  8.83 
Poor  145  404  3748  4152  19802  2.63  22.1  9.28 
Non-Poor   152  439  3657  4096  24485  2.41  17.8  8.33 
Source: Based on filed level primary data, 2001-2002 
Notes:  
1. Farm cropping intensity is calculated as: (cropped area of farmj /total cultivated area of farmj) 
2. Annual canal water charge per hectare is calculated as :sum(crop area of cropi on farmj*charge for cropi on 
farmj)/total cropped area of farmj.)) 
3. GVP is gross value of product per hectare calculated as: sum (crop area of cropi on farmj*Yield of cropi on farmj 
*Price of cropi on farmj) /total cropped area of farmj.) 
4. Poor are defined as those whose income is below national poverty line of Rupees 730/capita per month.  
 
Average annual irrigation charge per ha (area weighted) is Rs. 420/ha. Average per ha irrigation  
charge is inversely related to land size categories; landholders between 1 to 5 ha pay significantly 
more than the overall average, and those with greater than 10 ha pay less than the overall average. 
This is due to differences in cropping intensities, as cropping intensities are higher on smaller size 
farms (why?). As mentioned earlier, smaller size farms, constrained by the size of land tend to 
use their plots more intensively, making greater use of available family labor (and other inputs), 
and,  importantly,  they make greater use of groundwater. As shown in column 4 of Table 4 , 
average groundwater cost per ha is inversely related to farm size categories,  with smaller size 
farms using more groundwater and incurring higher costs and vice versa. Since under the present 
irrigation charging method, crop area that is partially irrigated with canal water and partially with 
groundwater, is fully liable for canal irrigation charges, small farmers are penalized for relatively 
greater use of groundwater. On average, poor farmers incur Rs. 56 more in annual total per ha 
cost of irrigation than the non-poor. Overall, cropping intensity based irrigation charging is pro-
large landholders, and it dis-favors small farmers and those poor farmers who make greater use of 
groundwater to increase their cropping intensities.  
 
Despite recent increases in irrigation charges, the  overall  charge level  in Pakistani systems 
remains low, constituting only 2.5 percent of GVP. As indicated earlier, such low charges are 
often defended for considerations such as food security, poverty, and farmers financial capacity to   32 
pay. As is clear from data in Table 4,  poor small farmers incur significantly higher cost per ha 
through greater use of groundwater, which is around 9 times more expensive than the canal water. 
Average groundwater cost per ha constitutes over 20 percent of GVP per ha (compared to only 
2.5 percent for canal water), and groundwater cost as a proportion of GVP per ha decreases with 
increase in size of landholdings. The above analysis suggests that the major beneficiaries of the 
present charging system, both structure and the level, are large landholders and the non-poor. 
 
We present here three policy options and analyze their implications for revenue generation/cost 
recovery and income distribution. The analysis here is based on filed level primary data. Our 
sample is 891 households with total land area of 4172 ha. Average landholding size is 4.68 
ha/household, with average size varying from 0.61 ha for the smallest land size group to over 17 
ha for the largest land size group. Similarly, average land size of the poor farmers is smaller (at 
around 2 ha) than that of the non-poor farmers. Land distribution is highly inequitable. Around 71 
percent of farm households own around 35 percent of total land, and 29 percent own 65 percent 
of total land area
4. In developing the policy options, we assume the following conditions will hold 
in the medium to long term: 
 
1.  canal water allocation will continue to be based on current method of physical rationing, 
rather than through market forces [it can be argued that in water short environments as in 
Pakistan, physical rationing achieved through say warabandi system may be as effective 
as price based allocation, because “ all farmers are water short, they experience directly 
the true v alue of their water ration and strive to save every drop and maximize 
productivity” (Perry 2001)]  
2.  canal systems will continue to operate as supply based systems, as it will be very costly 
to convert them into demand based systems (due to institutional and infrastructure 
constraints, such as cost of installing meters for water measurements, and cost of 
monitoring). 
3.  it may be difficult for authorities to adopt opportunity cost based pricing or marginal 
social cost based pricing due to lack of data and information especially on un-priced 
adverse and beneficial effects of water supply/use, and inherent difficulties in estimating 
such costs. 
4.  social objectives such as food self-sufficiency, food security, and poverty concerns will 
continue to be among dominating  considerations in setting irrigation water charges; 
major increases in water charges may not be politically feasible.  
5.  however, given the pressure on public funds, and the urgent need to improve O&M of 
most systems, small to moderate increase in irrigation charges, that is sufficient to cover 
O&M, may be politically feasible. 
6.  small to moderate increase in  irrigation charges m ight not influence farmers’ cropping 
decisions (so as to affect present GVP/ha) but may result in some efficiency gains in 
water supplies due to improved O&M with availability of increased financial resources. 
                                                 
4 Land distribution in lower Punjab and other provinces is even more inequitable compared to the situation in our study 
area. For Pakistan as a whole, as per official statistics, 81 percent of farm households own less than 39 percent to total 
farm land and 19 percent own over 61 percent of total farm land in the country.    33 
7.  also, small to moderate increase in irrigation charges, that is just sufficient for reasonable 
O&M,  will not significantly influence cost of production or profitability of farming, or 




Option -1:   Present policy  – no change in the structure and level of  irrigation charges; 
charges are based on cropped areas and cropping intensities; 
 
Option – 2:  Flat rate per unit of land based on land size, independent of crop type and 
cropping intensities, applied uniformly across all farm size categories; and  
 
Option – 3:   Differential rate per unit of land based on land size, applied differentially across 
various farm size categories – progressive rate structure (similar to increasing 
block rate charging in the domestic water supply sector). Lower irrigation charge 
for the first two hectares, applied uniformly to all land size categories, and charge 
increases progressively with increase in size of holdings above 2 hectares, by Rs. 
50 per ha for each successive category of land size,  as shown in the following 
equations and Figure 2:      
 
BL1 =  (R1*L1) where L1 = 2ha, and R1 = Rs. 350 (basic rate) 
BL2 =  (R1*L1)+(R2*L2) where L1+L2 = 3ha;  L1=2 ha; and L2= 1 and R2=Rs. 
400 
BL3 =  (R1*L1)+(R2*L2)+(R3*L3) where L1+L2+L3 = 5 ha and L1=2 ha and 
L2=1ha and L3=2ha, and R3=Rs. 450 
BL4 =  (R1*L1)+(R2*L2)+(R3*L3)+(R4*L4)  where L1+L2+L3+L4  = 10, and  
L1=2 ha and L2=1ha and L3 =2 ha and L4 = 5; and R4=500 
 
BL5 =  (R1*L1)+(R2*L2)+(R3*L3)+(R4*L4)+(R5*L5)  where 
L1+L2+L3+L4+L5 >10, and  L1=2 ha;  L2=1ha; L3 =2 ha; L4  = 5 and 
R5=Rs. 550 
 
BLi is a seasonal bill for water user category i ; L i is land size category (as in 
column 1 of table 4);  Ri is watercharge/rate in Rupees,  and i = 1 to 5. 
 
What is the reasonable O&M cost per ha. There is no precise answer to this question. O&M costs 
vary across space and time, and depend on a n umber of factors including condition of 
infrastructure, efficiency in management, and local costs of inputs. Actual, minimum and desired 
O&M costs may differ significantly. We assume that under efficient O&M regime (i.e. under 
autonomous decentralized financial arrangements), the current level of irrigation charges, which 
is roughly US$7/ha, is more or less adequate to carry out minimum O&M assuming 100 percent 
collection rate. [Note: Hassan and Khatri (1998) estimated annual average per ha O&M cost for  
Pakistani Punjab for 1997-98, where culturalable command area of province is 8.429 million ha 
and total O&M budget demand is Rs. 2336.35 million, at Rs. 277.17. By adjusting these figures 
to 2001-2002, using upper bound estimate of 11 percent increase in costs per year, total O&M   34 
budget demand would be roughly Rs. 3547 million or Rs. 420.8/ha
5 (or US$7/ha), which is equal 
to current level of charges. In India, actual average annual O&M expenditure per ha in Andhra 
Pradesh was US$5 in 2001, which was increased from US$2/ha prior to 2001]. Similarly, in four 
irrigation systems in Java in Indonesia, average O&M expenditure varies from US$4.5/ha to 
US$16.5/ha]. 
 


































As discussed earlier, under the present policy (option – 1), average irrigation charge per ha is Rs. 
420, and small farmers (first three landholding categories in Table 5) pay more on per ha basis 
compared to large landholders. With 100 percent collection rate, total revenue (from 4172 ha) is 
Rs. 1.632 million. Under policy option – 2,  i.e. flat rate charge based on size of landholdings 
using current average rate of Rs. 420 per ha, total revenue would increase to Rs. 1.752 million. 
However, total payment by small farmers will decrease by Rs. 19952 or by  Rs. 31.7 per farm 
household or by Rs.13.5/ha. On the other hand, total payment by large landholders (next two 
categories) would increase by Rs. 140082 or by Rs. 536.7 per farm household or by Rs. 51.5 per 
ha. On average, per ha irrigation charge would be 3.3 percent of GVP per ha. Option- 2 is better 
than option 1 both from revenue and equity perspectives, but it may not be pro-poor (as average 
charge per ha for poor farmers will increase from Rs. 404/ha under option – 1 to Rs. 420/ha under 
option  – 2). Under option – 3, total revenue will further increase by Rs. 134054 to Rs. 1.766 
million. Total payment by small farmers would decrease by Rs. 93053  or by Rs. 147.7 per farm 
household or by Rs. 64/ha. On the other hand, total payment by large landholders would increase 
by Rs. 227108 or by  Rs. 870.1 per farm household or  by  Rs. 83.5 per ha). Overall, average 
                                                 
5 These figures are adjusted using roughly 11 percent increase in costs per year.   35 
charge per ha would be lower at Rs. 384, which would be 3.0 percent of present level of GVP per 
ha. Clearly, option – 3  is better than option  – 1 and option – 2 from both revenue and equity 
perspectives. Option – 3 is pro-poor, as per ha water charge for the poor would be less than that 
for the non-poor, and would be significantly less than that in option -1 and option -2 (see last two 
rows in Table 5). 
 
Implications at the Province and Country Level 
 
What are the revenue and equity implications of the above figures at the province and country 
levels. Table 6 provides basic data on number and area of smaller and larger size farms for Punjab 
province and for Pakistan as a whole, and implications of three policy options for total revenues 
and income increases or transfers across farm size categories. In Punjab province, policy option – 
2 (flat rate charge at present level of average water rate) would result in annual gains for small 
farmers through reduced costs by Rs. 74.45 million, and cost to larger farmers would increase by 
Rs. 326.77 million, and total revenues will increase by 5.3 percent. Policy option – 2 is better  
than policy option – 1 in terms of equity and revenues. Under policy option – 3, smaller farmers, 
as a result of reduced costs, would gain annually by Rs. 346.88 million, and larger farmers would 
contribute more towards costs by Rs. 529.76 million, and overall revenue would increase 
significantly by 21.8 percent. With policy option – 3,   Rs. 876 million would be re-distributed 
with significant amount in favor of small and poor landholders in Punjab. 
       
For country as a whole, policy option – 2 would result in annual gains for small farmers through 
reduced costs by Rs. 130.06 million, and cost to larger farmers would increase by Rs. 605.97 
million, and annual total revenues will increase by 5.6 percent. Under policy option – 3, smaller 
farmers, as a result of reduced costs, would gain by Rs. 519.65 million, and larger farmers would 
contribute more towards costs by Rs. 842.45 million, and overall revenue would increase 
significantly by 22.7 percent. With policy option  – 3,   over Rs. 1362 million would be re-
distributed largely in favor of small and poor landholders in Pakistan. The findings suggest that 
the existing  irrigation charging policy in Pakistan favors larger landholders, and disfavors small 
and poor farmers. Policy options 2, and particularly 3 would result in annual redistribution of 
significant amount of funds in favor of small and the poor landholders.  
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Table 5: Implications of Alternate Policy Water Charging Policy for Various Land Size Categories and for the Poor and Non-poor. 
 
Source: based on primary data 2001-2002. 
 
           
Policy Option -1 
(Present Policy – crop 
based charge) 
Policy Option-2 
(Flat Rate based on Land 
Size) 
Policy Option -3 
(Differential Rate based 



























































  3  1  2  4  5=4*3  7=6*2  8=5*7  9=7/1  10  11=10*5  12=10/1       
<1 ha  0.61  19262  181  97  59  440  25270  3.3  420  24809  3.7  350  20675  3.1 
1.1 to <3 ha  1.98  21552  156  351  696  439  302913  2.6  420  292215  3.2  355  247805  2.7 
3.1 to <5 ha  3.83  22156  148  182  698  432  301878  2.4  420  293093  3.1  383  268528  2.9 
5.1 to <10 ha  6.74  22198  133  168  1132  385  428589  2.2  420  475566  3.3  423  482150  3.3 
10 ha and 
above  17.06  25013  115  93  1587  367  573338  2.2  420  666443  3.5  465  746885  3.8 
All  4.68  21909  148  891  4172  420  1631988  2.5  420  1752127  3.3  384  1766042  3.0 
Poor  3.86  51026  145  490  1893  404  705942  2.6  420  794951  3.5  379  779485  3.2 
Non-Poor  5.68  111499  152  401  2279  439  926046  2.4  420  957176  3.1  391  986557  2.8   37 
Table 6: Implications of Alternate Policy Options for Small and Large Landholders at Province 
and Country Level, Pakistan.  
Punjab  Basic data 
Total number of farms up to 5 ha (Million), smaller farms  2.35 
Total number of farms above 5 ha  (Million), larger 
farmers 
0.61 
Total number of farms- all (Million)  2.96 
Total area of farms up to 5 ha (Million ha)  4.36 
Total area of farms above 5 ha (Million ha)  6.61 
Total area of farms –All (Million ha)  10.97 
Policy Implications  Policy 





Total revenue from smaller farms (Rs. Million)   1902.36  1832.81  1824.24 
Total revenue from larger farms (Rs. Million)  2471.94  2774.67  3501.82 
Total revenue from all farms (Rs. Million)  4374.3  4607.48  5326.06 
Increase in smaller farmers income in Rs. Million (reduced 
total payments) with option -1 as base 
-  74.45  346.88 
Increase in large farmers contribution to costs in Rs. 
Million (increased total payments ) with option -1 as base 
-  326.77  529.76 
Pakistan  Basic Data 
Total number of farms up to 5 ha (Million), smaller farms  4.10 
Total number of farms above 5 ha  (Million), larger farms  0.97 
Total number of farms- all (Million)  5.07 
Total area of farms up to 5 ha (Million ha)  7.43 
Total area of farms above 5 ha (Million ha)  11.72 
Total area of farms –All (Million ha)  19.15 
Policy Implications  Policy 





Total revenue from smaller farms (Rs. Million)   3240.87  3122.09  3103.72 
Total revenue from larger farms (Rs. Million)  4374.22  4920.76  6237.13 
Total revenue from all farms (Rs. Million)  7615.09  8042.85  9340.85 
Increase in smaller farmers income in Rs. Million (reduced 
total payments) with option -1 as base 
-  130.06  519.65 
 Increase in large farmers contribution to costs in Rs. 
Million (increased total payments ) with option -1 as base 
-  605.97  842.45 
Source: calculations based on landholdings data from Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan, Ministry of Food, 
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Discussion 
 
The main points from the discussions and analyses earlier sections can be summarized as follows: 
(a) i n the Chinese and Vietnamese systems studied, land and water  distribution  is  relatively 
equitable. Irrigation charges are directly or indirectly linked to irrigation service delivery/ water 
supplies. In these systems, irrigation charges, regardless of whether based on size of landholdings 
or cropping intensities, tends to be relatively equitable. What is important for these systems is to 
increase the charge to the level where it reflects cost of supplying water and /or benefits derived 
from water use and to further improve on collection efficiency; (b) in Indonesia, landholdings are 
generally of smaller sizes, and there is element of inequity in distribution of both land and water. 
Under multiple criteria based charging  method  (as  in the transferred systems) structure of 
charging is such that charges are linked to water supplied/used, and it accounts for poverty 
concerns. Here too,  what is needed is to  increase  the level of irrigation charges and overall 
collection efficiency for improved cost recovery; (c) in the South Asian systems, land and water 
distribution across farms tends to be fairly inequitable, and charge is not linked to irrigation 
service or amount of water supplied, and overall charge level is very low. In such systems, not 
only the level of charge needs to be increased, the structure of charging also needs to be improved 
for improving cost recovery in more equitable and pro-poor ways; (d) irrigation charging methods 
in Vietnam and China are relatively better as they account for locational differences in service 
delivery /water supplies, and to some extent reflect cost of supplying water. On the other hand, 
while present charging methods in South Asian systems  are easy to administer, they lack 
transparency and are often inequitable and biased against the poor small farmers; and (e) 
quantitative analysis suggests that irrigation charge level affects system performance, which in 
turn, influences poverty in the systems, that is low irrigation charges indirectly dis-benefit the 
poor. Detailed analysis of charging structure for Pakistani systems demonstrates that under 
conditions of inequitable land and water distribution, inappropriate charging structure may also 
directly dis-benefit the poor. 
  
For systems as in Pakistan, the study offers two options: flat rate or differential rate charging 
based on size of land holdings. While both options would result in improved cost recovery, flat 
rate
6 [which is relatively straight forward and easy to administer] would be equitable and 
                                                 
6 On 10 June 2003, the Punjab government has taken a historic decision to change canal irrigation charging policy 
from crop area-cum-crop type based charging to crop area based flat rate charging. Under crop area-cum-crop type 
based system, irrigation charges were levied based on area cropped and differentiated by crop type, crop condition and 
crop season. Charges were generally higher for high water consuming crops such as rice, and low for less water 
consuming crops such as wheat (for example, per hectare crop based irrigation charges prior to June 10 were Rs. 37 for 
fodder, Rs. 148 for wheat, Rs. 222 for cotton, Rs. 297 for rice, Rs 432 for sugarcane). Under the new flat rate system, 
per hectare irrigation charges are to be fixed for Rabi and for Kharif seasons regardless of the type of crops grown in 
each season (new rate per hectare are Rs 124 for Rabi and Rs. 210 for Kharif crops, regardless of the type of crops 
grown). Several factors have led to this change. These include: (a) the crop based charging system was considered 
obsolete and not in line with changing water and irrigated agriculture situation; (b) it was thought to be often 
manipulated by the influential farmers and revenue officials (such as mis-reporting and mis-recording of crop types and 
crop areas, e.g. charging for fodder rates when high water rate crops such as rice or sugarcane were cultivated); (c) as 
the water charge assessment was based on the discretion of the revenue officials, it is generally perceived that it has 
lead to creating an environment for rent seeking behavior;  (d) crop based charges were considered advantageous to 
large farmers and disadvantageous to small farmers that constitute majority in the farming community; and (e) old 
system has lead to increased pressure on public funds resulting from widening gap between irrigation expenditures and   39 
differential rate would be pro-poor. The suggested differential rate method (which is also 
straightforward to administer and has an advantage of having a pro-poor dimension) is similar to 
increasing block rate charging for domestic water supplies and electricity. In the domestic water 
supply sector, where water can be measured, increasing block rate charging is applied partly 
because of equity and poverty concerns where low charge is applied to certain basic amount of 
water, that is, for basic needs for low volume consumers, and charge is increased progressively 
for high-volume consumers (i.e. generally the rich consumers using water for luxurious purposes 
such as for swimming pools etc). In the irrigation sector, where water measurement at the field 
level is difficult (due to technological/administration/cost constraints), charge can still be linked 
to water supplies based on landholding size (as land and water are coupled  in South Asian 
systems). Policy change towards suggested flat rate or differential rate would result in significant 
increase in revenue generation/cost recovery  and  improved benefits to the poor; and  it is 
something  that is doable. Either of the suggested  options 2 or 3 are feasible, and could be 
implemented with existing institutional arrangements in place, and as such do not involve any 
costs. Land ownership records available at  the  revenue department and at the water user 
association level could be used  for levying charges. Importantly, electronic data base/ 
computerization of land records is presently underway in Pakistan, that could further facilitate 
implementation of the suggested policy interventions. Major benefits with such a policy change 
would include:(1) more funds available for O&M, that can be expected to result in improved 
O&M leading to increased efficiency in irrigation supply and improved system productivity; (2) 
benefits in terms of reduced costs to small and poor landholders; and more importantly, it would 
be a step forward to reversing existing inequities not only in irrigation charging but in overall 





                                                                                                                                                 
revenue collection [ e.g. in recent years total revenue collected through  irrigation  charges in the Punjab province 
accounted for 31.4 percent or Rs.1.6 billion of the total expenditures of Rs. 5.1 billion. Also, the estimates suggest that 
the Punjab government has been spending three rupees for every one rupee of water charge collected]. Reaction to this 
policy change has been mixed. While there are many supporters of this change who see this as a welcome development, 
some continue to resist and criticize this policy change.  
 
There are three key issues in relation to this policy change. First, in the newly introduced flat rate system, the charge is 
based on the farm area cropped during Rabi and Kharif seasons (i.e. flat rate per hectare of area cropped in each 
season) and not based on farm area owned or farm area having water entitlement or area receiving water. Under 
warabandi type of systems, water allocation is made based on the size of farm landholdings. In aggregate terms, large 
farmers receive and use more canal water than small farmers. On per hectare basis, if we assume that small and large 
farmers receive similar amount of water, small farmers who generally have higher cropping intensity will end up 
paying more in per hectare irrigation charge than large farmers. As in the past, under the new policy, area irrigated 
partially from surface water and partially from groundwater would be fully liable for canal water charges. Those who 
make more use of groundwater and other inputs to increase their cropping intensity would have to pay more in per 
hectare water charges. It is important to note that it is the farm size that forms the basis of water allocation, regardless 
of the proportion of farm area cropped. Therefore, it makes sense to levy flat rate charge based on farm size or farm 
area having water entitlement. The new crop area based flat rate policy, though does not account for intra-seasonal crop 
differences, it accounts for inter-season crop differences and, like old system, irrigation charges are levied based on 
area cropped and cropping intensity during a season. So, while the new system would help in addressing the crop type-
misreporting issue, but it would not resolve the problem of crop area mis-reporting. The flat rate per unit of land based 
on land size, independent of crop type and cropping intensities would be better option to address both of these issues.   40 
 
Summary, Conclusions and Implications 
 
In recent years, there have been much  debate and  discussions  on the  role of water 
charging/pricing and cost recovery in the context of reforms for improving management of water 
resources.  Review of the past studies suggest that much of the empirical work on  water 
charging/pricing  have focused from the perspectives of efficiency in resource allocation with 
mounting concerns over ever increasing scarcity and competition for water, with little attention to  
equity, income distribution and poverty implications of charging/pricing tools.  
In this regard, the study addresses t wo key questions: how irrigation charging is linked to 
irrigation performance and poverty; and what are cost recovery, equity and poverty implications 
of alternate charging methods under conditions of (in) equity in land and water distribution. The 
study describes in detail key characteristics of charging methods that are in practice on ground 
based on field level information and data from 26 irrigation systems in six countries: Bangladesh, 
China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Vietnam; undertakes comparative analysis of alternate 
charging methods; identifies their strengths and limitations; and highlights factors influencing the 
choice of charging methods in particular settings. The analysis covers three main aspects of 
charging: the level of charge, the structure of charge and collection aspects. The study focuses on 
irrigation charging in large and medium scale surface irrigation systems in the study countries.  
In South Asian systems, level of irrigation charges varies from US$4.6/ha to US$22/ha. While 
irrigation charge level is highest in Bangladeshi systems, collection rate is very low (5-15 
percent). Irrigation charges in the Indian systems have recently been increased to US$ 10/ha, with 
collection rate varying significantly across systems. In  Pakistani systems studied, irrigation 
charges vary from US$4.6/ha to US$10.6/ha, and overall collection rate is higher (80-99 percent) 
than that in Bangladeshi and Indian systems. In Indonesia, irrigation charges vary from US$1/ha 
to US$20/ha, and collection rate is fairly high, especially in transferred systems. On the other 
hand, irrigation charges in China and Vietnam are much higher than those in Indonesia and South 
Asian systems. In China, irrigation charges vary from US$26 to US$67/ha (1.8 to 5.2 percent of 
gross value of product), with average collection rate of 80 percent. In Vietnam, where irrigation is 
charged based on crop output, water charge level is fairly high ( US$58 to US$61/ha), 
constituting 4.6 and 6.3 percent of gross value of product, and overall collection rate is also high 
(85 to 99 percent).  
 
The study findings indicate that: (1) i n the Chinese and Vietnamese systems studied, land and 
water distribution  is relatively equitable. Irrigation charges are directly or indirectly linked to 
irrigation service delivery/ water supplies.  In  these systems,  irrigation  charges, regardless of 
whether based on size of landholdings or cropping intensities, tends to  be relatively equitable. 
What is important for revenue generation/cost recovery for these systems is to increase the charge 
to the level where it reflects cost of supplying water and /or benefits derived from water use and 
to further improve on collection efficiency; (2) in Indonesia, landholdings are generally of smaller 
sizes, and there is element of inequity in distribution of both land and water. Under multiple 
criteria based charging method (as in the transferred systems) structure of charging is such that   41 
charges are linked to water supplied/used, and it accounts for poverty concerns. Here too, what is 
needed is to increase the level of irrigation charges and overall collection efficiency for improved 
cost recovery; (3) in the South Asian systems, land and water distribution across farms tends to be 
fairly inequitable, and charge is not linked to irrigation service or amount of water supplied, and 
overall charge level is very low.  In such systems, not only the level of charge needs to be 
increased, the structure of charging also needs to be improved for improving cost recovery in 
more equitable and pro-poor ways; (4) irrigation charging methods in Vietnam and China are 
relatively better as they account for locational differences in service delivery /water supplies, and 
to some extent reflect cost of supplying water. On the other hand, while present charging methods 
in South Asian systems, are easy to administer, they lack transparency and are often inequitable 
and biased against the poor small farmers; and (5) quantitative analysis suggests that irrigation 
charge level affects system performance, which in turn, influences poverty in the systems, that is 
low charge level indirectly dis-benefit the poor.  
 
Detailed analysis of charging structure for Pakistani systems demonstrates that under conditions 
of inequitable land and water distribution, charging structure that does not link the charge with 
irrigation may also directly dis-benefit the poor. Using primary data from the selected system in 
Pakistan, the study analyzes three policy options: (1) present policy, where charges are based on 
cropped areas and cropping intensities; (2) charges based on flat rate per unit of land, applied 
uniformly across various farm size categories; and (3) charges based on differential rate per unit 
of land based on land size, applied differentially across various farm size categories, l ower 
irrigation  charge for the first two hectares, applied uniformly to all land size categories, and 
charge increases progressively with increase in size of holdings above 2 hectares, by Rs. 50 per 
ha for each successive category of land size. The results of the analysis indicate that option – 1 
(current policy) is pro-large landholders and penalizes poor small farmers whose cropping 
intensity is generally higher due to relatively greater use of groundwater and other factors. Option 
– 2 is better than option – 1, but it is not pro-poor. Option – 3 is better than both option – 1 and 
option – 2 from both revenue and equity perspectives. Option – 3 is pro-poor, as per ha irrigation 
charge for the poor would be less than for the non-poor, and overall revenue would be more than 
that in the first two options.    
 
Analysis at the province level (Punjab) indicate that  policy option – 2 (flat rate charge at present 
level of average water rate) would result in gains for small farmers through reduced costs by Rs. 
74.45 million, and annual total revenues will increase by 5.3 percent. Under policy option – 3, 
smaller farmers, as a result of reduced costs, would gain annually  by Rs. 346.88 million, and 
larger farmers would contribute more towards costs by Rs. 529.76 million, and overall annual 
revenue would increase significantly by 21.8 percent. With policy option – 3,   Rs. 876 million 
would be re-distributed each year, with significant amount in favor of small and poor landholders 
in Punjab. For country as a whole, policy option – 2  would result in annual gains for small 
farmers through reduced costs by Rs. 130.06 million, and cost to larger farmers would increase by 
Rs. 605.97 million, and total revenues will increase by 5.6 percent. Under policy option  – 3, 
smaller farmers, as a result of reduced costs, would gain annually  by Rs. 519.65 million, and 
larger farmers would contribute more towards costs by Rs. 842.45 million, and overall revenue   42 
would increase significantly by 22.7 percent. With policy option – 3, over Rs. 1362 million would 
be re-distributed each y ear with significant amount in favor of small and poor landholders in 
Pakistan.  
 
While both options would result in improved revenues/cost recovery, flat rate [which is relatively 
straight forward and easy to administer] would be equitable and differential rate would be pro-
poor. The suggested differential rate method (which is also not too difficult to administer) is 
similar to increasing block rate charging for domestic water supplies. In the domestic water 
supplies, where water can be measured, increasing block rate charging is applied partly because 
of equity and poverty concerns where low charge is applied to certain basic amount of water, that 
is, for basic needs for low volume consumers, and charge is increased progressively for high-
volume consumers (i.e. generally the rich consumers using water for luxurious purposes such as 
for swimming pools etc). In the irrigation sector, where water measurement at the filed level may 
be difficult (due to technological/administration/cost constraints), charge can still be linked to 
water supplies based on landholding size. Either of the suggested options, flat or differential rate, 
are feasible and could be implemented with existing institutional arrangements in place, and as 
such do not involve any costs. Major benefits with such a policy change would include:(1) more 
funds available for O&M, that can be expected to result in improved O&M leading to increased 
efficiency in irrigation supply and improved system productivity; (2) benefits in terms of reduced 
costs to small and poor landholders; and more importantly, it would be a step forward to 
reversing existing inequities not only in irrigation charging but in overall benefits of investments 
in irrigation. 
 
Main lessons leant from the study can be summarized as follows: (a) there are a number of 
charging methods in practice in the studied systems, and the choice of a charging method in a 
particular setting depends on a range of factors including water allocation mechanisms and water 
rights, characteristics of delivery systems (supply-based ore demand –based), value of irrigation 
water, variability in water flows and distribution losses, number of farms to be served, social 
objectives such as food security and poverty alleviation and other factors such as transaction cost 
of charge collection.; (b) irrigation charging influences irrigation performance, which in turn, 
influences poverty.; (c) the impacts of a particular charging method on system performance 
depends on distribution structure of land and water. Where land and water tends to be equitably 
distributed (as in China and Vietnam) it is mainly the level of charge that matters for revenues 
and cost recovery. On the other hand, in settings where land and water distribution tends to be 
inequitable, both the level and the structure of charging are important not only  in relation to 
revenues and cost recovery, but they have implications for equity in income distribution. Under 
such settings, indiscriminate application of low charge policy dis-benefits the poor. Also, in such 
settings charging structure, which is not linked to irrigation service and which do not account for 
landholding size, often favors the non-poor.   
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Appendix – A  
 
Efficiency Related Aspects of Water Pricing/Charging 
  
In the perfectly competitive markets, pricing mechanism endogenously performs  efficiency 
incentive and financial  functions. An economically efficient outcome is achieved when the 
marginal value product of a resource is identical across alternative uses, and is equal to its 
marginal cost of production – marginal benefit is equal to marginal cost. Overall, an economic 
efficiency in resource allocation is achieved such that it is not possible, through further 
reallocations, to increase the welfare of society [that is, in a strict sense, resource allocation is 
efficient if it is impossible through further reallocations to make one person better off without 
making someone else worse off (also called Pareto efficient allocation)] 
 
However, unlike other (pure private goods) whose allocation is determined by prices (such as 
fertilizers), unique characteristics of water limit the effectiveness of price system to allocate water 
as under free market conditions – due to market failures – where market mechanism fails to 
achieve an efficient allocation of resources. The major sources of market failures for water are as 
follows: 
 
1.  Lumpiness of investments such as in irrigation systems. 
2.  Massive economies of scale
7 in the production or distribution of water. Because of the 
economies of scale, average cost of production declines over a broad range of output 
levels. Lumpiness of investments and presence of economies of scale means that one firm 
can produce the entire output more cheaply than multiple firms could, and monopoly 
arises naturally. Water supplies are, therefore, provided by public authority in natural 
monopoly position. 
3.  Externalities, both positive and negative, associated with provision and use of water. For 
example, land salinization caused by rising water tables or canal seepage causing 
negative externality in production. Similarly positive externality, for example in 
consumption, may occur from indirect or secondary benefits of water use in production of 
commodities, which are not accounted for by market forces. In the presence of 
externalities, the opportunity cost
8 or social cost
9 of water is often unknown or costly to 
determine.       
 
Public sector provision of water is often justified on account of the above unique characteristics 
of water. This is particularly so in developing countries where most large and medium scale 
surface systems are operated and managed by the government or semi-government authorities. 
Points 1 and 2 above mean that there is a case of natural monopoly in the provision of water, that 
is average costs decrease over a broad range of output levels. In the absence of any regulation, a 
monopolist will chose to produce  that output for which marginal cost is equal to marginal benefit 
(or marginal revenue). With downward sloping demand curve, market price will exceed both 
marginal revenue or marginal cost at the output level produced by the monopolist. A regulatory 
                                                 
7 Production involves economies of scale if, when all input quantities are doubled, the quantity of output is more than 
doubled. Economies of scale occur due to factors which cause long run average cost of production to decrease as the 
firms’ output increases. Thus firm’s long run average cost is negatively sloped in the presence of economies of scale.  
8 Opportunity cost of water is generally defined as the value of water in its next best use.  
9 Social cost of water includes both the cost of supplying water and costs or benefits associated with un priced adverse 
or beneficial effects related to provision and use of water.   46 
agency may set a lower price, which is equal to marginal cost of producing the expanded level of 
output (as demand would increase at lower price level). The objective of marginal cost pricing 
here may be to induce the monopolist to expand output to the optimal level (to reduce the cost of 
monopoly to the society). However, because of the declining nature of costs, price which is equal 
to marginal cost will fall below average costs. Therefore, with the regulated price, which is lower 
than the market price, monopoly would be operating at loss, which would require that either the 
monopolist abandon the use of marginal cost pricing or the government subsidizes the monopoly 
for loss. Average cost pricing and price discrimination are commonly used instruments to address 
these problems. 
 
In the presence of externalities (positive or negative or both), an efficient outcome that maximizes 
the social welfare would require that marginal social benefits of water in alternative uses are 
equalized, and these are equal to marginal social costs. Water price can be set equal to marginal 
net social cost (accounting for both social benefits and social costs), which includes cost of 
providing water and all important social effects associated with production, supply and uses of 
water. However, in the presence of externalities, social benefits or costs with water supply or use 
may differ widely over space, time or across users, and price based on marginal social costs and 
marginal social benefits will have to be different for each user, which present difficulty for real 
world application of marginal social cost/benefit based pricing. These and other related issues 
































Table: Average Price/Charge for Agricultural Water in Selected Countries  
 
Country/Location  Water 
Price/Charge 
Reference Year  Pricing Charging 
Structure 
Source 
Pakistan  1.49 – 5.80 $/ha)    Depending on 
crop type and 
region  
Ahmad (2000) 
Pakistan (Punjab)  4.6-10.6 ($/ha)  2002  Depending on 




India (Andhra Pradesh and 
Madhya Pradesh) 
10 ($/ha)  2002  Depending on 
crop type and 
region 
This study 
Bangladesh (South- western and 
West-central Bangladesh) 
20-22 ($/ha)  2002  Depending on 
crop type and 
region 
This study 
Sri Lanka  0.00  2002   -   
China (Henan and Ningxia 
Provinces) 
26-67 ($/ha)  2002  Depending on 
crop type and 
region 
This study 
Vietnam (Red River Delta and 
North Central Coast) 
58 – 61 ($/ha)  2002  Depending on 
crop type, crop 
output   and 
region 
This study 
Indonesia (Central Java)    1 – 20 ($/ha)  2002  Depending on 





Jordan (Jordan Valley)  0.009/m3 ($/m3)  1993  Volumetric 
Pricing 
Tsur and D inar 
(1995) 
Egypt  0.00      Ahmad (2000) 




Saudi Arabia  0.00        
Sudan  4.72-11.22 ($/ha)    Depending on 
crop type and 
region 
Ahmad (2000) 
Syria  50.0 ($/ha)       
Morocco  0.013  – 0.037 
($/m3) 
1994  Volumetric 
pricing 
Tsur and Dinar 
(1995) 
Nigeria  15-100 ($/ha)  1987   Area based 
charging 
Tsur and Dinar 
(1995) 
Mexico Alto Rio Lerma 
Irrigation district) 
0.0039 ($/m3)  1997  Area based  Kloenzen (1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 